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SUMMARY
Natural circulation flows can develop within a reactor coolant system (RCS) during certain severe 
reactor accidents, transferring decay energy from the core to other parts of the RCS. The associated heatup 
of RCS structures can lead to pressure boundary failures; with notable vulnerabilities in the pressurizer 
surge line, the hot leg nozzles, and the steam generator (SG) tubes. The potential for a steam generator tube 
rupture (SGTR) is of particular concern because fission products could be released to the environment 
through such a failure. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed a program to address SG 
tube integrity issues in operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs) based on the possibility for environ-
mental release. An extensive effort to evaluate the potential for accident-induced SGTRs using 
SCDAP/RELAP5 at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) was directed 
as one part of the NRC program.
All SCDAP/RELAP5 calculations performed during the INEEL evaluation were based on station 
blackout accidents (and variations thereof) because those accidents are considered to be one of the more 
likely scenarios leading to natural circulation flows at temperatures and pressures that could threaten SG 
tube integrity (as well as the integrity of other vulnerable RCS pressure boundaries). Variations that were 
addressed included consideration of the effects of RCP seal leaks, intentional RCS depressurization 
through pressurizer PORVs, SG secondary depressurization, DC-HL bypass flows, U-tube SG sludge 
accumulation, and quenching of upper plenum stainless steel upon relocation to the lower head. Where 
available, experimental data was used to guide simulation of natural circulation flows. Independent 
reviews of the applicability of the natural circulation experimental data, the suitability of the code, and the 
adequacy of the modeling were completed and review recommendations were incorporated into the evalu-
ation within budget and schedule limitations.
SCDAP/RELAP5 results indicate that surge line (or hot leg) failures will be the first failures in the 
RCS pressure boundary in all calculations as a result of heat transferred by natural circulation flows. Those 
results held for all operating PWRs that were analyzed in cases with and without RCP seal leaks, cases 
with and without intentional RCS depressurization through pressurizer PORVs, cases with and without SG 
secondary depressurization, cases with and without DC-HL bypass flows, cases with and without U-tube 
SG sludge accumulation, and cases with and without quenching of upper plenum stainless steel upon relo-
cation to the lower head (if that steel was predicted to melt). Results also indicated that secondary failures 
of the RCS pressure boundary will not occur after RCS depressurization and accumulator injection associ-
ated with the first RCS pressure boundary failure. In other words, a SGTR (or any other secondary failure 
in the RCS pressure boundary) would not be expected after depressurization through the first (surge line or 
hot leg) failure. Results from sensitivity analyses indicate that uncertainties associated with natural circula-
tion behavior, heat transfer, and variety of other related factors are not large enough to adversely affect 
those conclusions. In one calculation for one operating PWR, SGTR was found to be imminent at the time 
of the first RCS pressure boundary failure as a result of large pressure pertubations associated with quench-
ing of molten upper plenum stainless steel. Uncertainties may be large enough to preclude the possibility 
that SGTR could be the first RCS pressure boundary failure in that case. However, the assumption that 
stainless steel can candle through the core without refreezing and the subsequent simulation of complete 
and essentially instantaneous quenching are believed to be overly conservative with respect to the SGTR 
prediction. Any SGTR concerns in this single case would be expected to significantly decrease if more 
detailed modeling were applied. Consequently, the potential for SGTR in operating PWRs during TMLB’ 
accidents is low. These conclusions apply if SG tubes (and other RCS piping) are defect free.
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SCDAP/RELAP5 EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL 
FOR STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES AS A 
RESULT OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS IN OPERATING 
PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS
1. INTRODUCTION
Natural circulation flows can develop within a reactor coolant system (RCS) during certain severe 
reactor accidents. Those flows are important because they can transfer decay energy from the core to other 
parts of the RCS. The associated heatup of RCS structures can lead to pressure boundary failures; with 
notable vulnerabilities in the pressurizer surge line, the hot leg nozzles, and the steam generator (SG) 
tubes. The potential for a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) is of particular concern because fission 
products could be released to the environment through such a failure.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed a program to address SG tube integrity issues 
in operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs) based on the possibility for environmental release. An 
extensive effort to evaluate the potential for accident-induced SGTRs using SCDAP/RELAP51 at the 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) was directed as one part of the NRC 
program. This report summarizes the work completed during the course of that INEEL evaluation.
All SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses performed during this evaluation were based on station blackout acci-
dents (and variations thereof) because those accidents are considered to be one of the more likely scenarios 
leading to natural circulation flows at temperatures and pressures that could threaten SG tube integrity (as 
well as the integrity of other vulnerable RCS pressure boundaries). Natural circulation flows that can 
develop in operating PWRs during a station blackout and contribute to RCS structural heating are 
described in Section 2. That section also includes a summary of the experimental work that was available 
and used as a basis for the SCDAP/RELAP5 simulation of corresponding natural circulation flows. 
Section 3 contains descriptions of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code, the operating PWRs that were analyzed at 
the INEEL, and the associated SCDAP/RELAP5 models. Independent reviews of the applicability of the 
natural circulation experimental data, the suitability of the code, and the adequacy of the modeling are dis-
cussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains descriptions of the analyses that were performed, explanations why 
each of the analyses were needed, and summaries of the SCDAP/RELAP5 results. Associated uncertainties 
are discussed in Section 6 and conclusions based on the INEEL work are given in Section 7. Finally, refer-
ences are listed in Section 8.
2. NATURAL CIRCULATION IN OPERATING PWRS
Three different natural circulation flow patterns can develop in operating PWRs during station black-
out accidents including in-vessel, full-loop, and hot leg countercurrent modes. Provisions were made to 
appropriately simulate those natural circulation modes in all SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses completed in this 
evaluation. However, operating PWRs use either U-tube or once-through SGs and the SG configuration 
has some impact on the nature of the flow patterns as explained below.
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2.1. Flows in PWRs with U-Tube SGs
In-vessel, full-loop, and hot leg countercurrent natural circulation flow patterns that can develop dur-
ing station blackout accidents in operating PWRs with U-tube SGs are depicted in Figure 1. In-vessel nat-
ural circulation is generally characterized by fluid heating in the center of the core and fluid cooling in the 
vessel upper plenum as indicated in the figure. In-vessel natural circulation of either liquid or vapor can 
develop. In-vessel natural circulation of liquid primarily occurs when vessels are liquid solid. In-vessel 
natural circulation of vapor can develop after the vessel liquid level drops below the top of the core. At that 
time, the circulation “cell” may be only slightly taller than the upper plenum, although “cell” height can 
increase if the liquid level continues to drop. Upper plenum internal structures can be heated to the melting 
point as a result of in-vessel natural circulation of superheated vapor. However, heating of the vessel in the 
upper plenum to the point of failure is not normally a concern because less massive structures (i.e., the 
pressurizer surge line, the hot leg nozzles, and the SG tubes) are subject to creep rupture much earlier.
Full-loop natural circulation consists of hot flow from the core with fluid cooling primarily in the SGs. 
Full-loop natural circulation can normally develop only when a continuous single phase (either liquid or 
vapor) flow path exists from the bottom of the vessel downcomer skirt, to the vessel outlet, through the 
RCS hot and cold leg piping, and back through the vessel downcomer (see Figure 1). In station blackout 
accidents, full-loop natural circulation of liquid generally begins shortly after reactor coolant pump (RCP) 
coastdown and persists until vapor from in-core boiling begins to accumulate in the top of the SGs. Full-
loop circulation of vapor can develop after the vessel liquid level falls below the bottom of the downcomer 
skirt and liquid in at least one RCP loop seal begins to clear. A potential for significant SG tube heating 
exists if full-loop circulation of superheated vapor develops.
As indicated in Figure 1, hot leg countercurrent natural circulation in PWRs with U-tube SGs consists 
of hot flow from the core to the SG outlet plenum through the top of the hot leg pipe and a fraction of the 
SG U-tubes. Colder flow then returns to the core through the remaining U-tubes and the bottom of the hot 
leg pipe. Unlike in-vessel and full-loop natural circulation modes, hot leg countercurrent natural circula-
tion develops only with vapor flow. That is because countercurrent flow requires a single phase flow path 
and a blockage downstream of the SG outlet plenum. When the RCS is liquid solid, the single phase flow 
path exists but the required flow blockage does not. Consequently, full-loop natural circulation of liquid 
tends to develop under those conditions. After vapor begins to accumulate in the top of the SGs, full-loop 
circulation of liquid stops and loop fluids temporarily stagnate. As boiling progresses, loop liquids are 
gradually depleted until the required single phase vapor flow path is established. At that point, RCP loop 
seals are normally full of liquid, providing the required blockage of vapor flow downstream of the SGs. 
Under those conditions, countercurrent natural circulation of vapor can develop. If liquid in a RCP loop 
seal subsequently begins to clear (and the vessel liquid level is below the bottom of the downcomer skirt), 
hot leg countercurrent natural circulation of vapor can transition to full-loop natural circulation of vapor. 
(Note that hot leg countercurrent natural circulation and full-loop natural circulation of vapor can develop 
simultaneously in multi-loop plants depending on the vessel liquid level and conditions in the various RCP 
loop seals.)
Experimental investigations of hot leg countercurrent natural circulation were conducted by Westing-
house because that flow pattern can be a primary mechanism for RCS structural heating during station 
blackout accidents.2,3 A one-seventh scale model of a Westinghouse four-loop PWR was used in the 
experiments. The model represented a half section of the PWR and therefore included a vessel to simulate 
an equivalent portion of the reactor, two hot legs, and two SGs. The vessel contained structures to repre-
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sent the upper plenum internals and one half of the core fuel assemblies with radial and axial flow resis-
tance similar to the prototype. Core power was supplied through electrical heaters.
Initial experiments were conducted at low (atmospheric) pressure using water and sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6) as working fluids. Subsequent experiments were conducted at high pressure (1.4 to 3.4 MPa) using 
SF6. (Experimental pressures of 1.4 to 3.4 MPa with SF6 are reported to be equivalent to 15.2 to 16.5 MPa
with steam in the prototype.) Both steady state and transient tests were completed with variations in core 
power. In all cases, experimental results verified that relatively-stable hot leg countercurrent natural circu-
lation flow patterns will develop. In this context, stability is used as a descriptor because countercurrent 
flows developed over a wide range of experimental conditions, stratified flow patterns in the hot leg pipe 
existed without interaction between the hot and cold streams, and natural circulation flows were robust in 
that they quickly re-established following major pertubations (like that introduced by pressurizer relief 
valve cycling).
Evaluation of experiment data indicated that hot leg countercurrent natural circulation in PWRs with 
U-tube SGs can be characterized by mixing fractions, a recirculation ratio, and the fraction of SG U-tubes 
that carry hot flow in the forward direction. The mixing fraction refers to experimentally-observed interac-
tions between hot and cold streams in the SG inlet plenum as depicted in Figure 1. The hot mixing fraction 
was defined as the fraction of hot flow discharged from the top of the hot leg pipe that mixes with vapor in 
the SG inlet plenum before entering the SG U-tubes. Similarly, the cold mixing fraction was defined as the 
fraction of the cold flow returning from the SG U-tubes that mixes with the SG inlet plenum vapor before 
entering the bottom of the hot leg pipe. The recirculation ratio refers to the relative magnitude of flow 
within the SG and was defined as the SG U-tube flow divided by the hot leg flow. Recirculation ratios 
greater than one indicate that SG tube-to-plenum-to-SG tube flow is larger than the flow entering the SG 
inlet plenum from the hot leg. The fraction of SG U-tubes that carry hot flow in the forward direction and 
the other characteristic parameters from Westinghouse high pressure steady state and transient tests are 
summarized in Table 1. Hot leg countercurrent modeling for plants with U-tube SGs considered in this 
evaluation was based on benchmarks derived from the high pressure tests because those tests were 
assumed to be closest to the conditions that would be expected during station blackout accidents.
2.2. Flows in PWRs with Once-Through SGs
In-vessel, full-loop, and hot leg countercurrent natural circulation flow patterns that can develop dur-
ing station blackout accidents in operating PWRs with once-through SGs are depicted in Figure 2. In-ves-
sel and full-loop natural circulation flows (as previously described) behave similarly in PWRs with either 
U-tube or once-through SGs. However, the SG configuration substantially affects hot leg countercurrent 
flow patterns, which can be seen by comparing Figures 1 and 2.
Results from experiments conducted at the University of Maryland at College Park indicate that coun-
tercurrent natural circulation in PWRs with once-through SGs includes the flow of hot vapor through the 
top of the horizontal part of the hot leg pipe.4 Complex mixing and heat transfer occurs in the vertical part 
of the hot leg, with a net flow of cooler vapor that moves downward and returns to the vessel through the 
bottom of the horizontal part of the hot leg pipe as shown in Figure 2. Like countercurrent flow in PWRs 
with U-tube SGs, the described pattern will only develop with a single phase vapor flow path and a flow 
blockage downstream of the SG. If the flow blockage is not maintained (i.e., if liquid in a RCP loop seal 
begins to clear and the vessel liquid level falls below the bottom of the downcomer skirt), hot leg counter-
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current natural circulation of vapor can transition to full-loop natural circulation of vapor. (Note that hot 
leg countercurrent natural circulation and full-loop natural circulation of vapor can develop simultaneously 
in multi-loop plants depending on the vessel liquid level and conditions in the various RCP loop seals.)
The University of Maryland experiments were conducted in a comprehensive scaled representation of 
a Babcock & Wilcox PWR. The model included a reactor vessel with an internal downcomer and reactor 
vessel vent valves, two hot legs, two once-through SGs, four cold legs, and a pressurizer with a surge line 
and a power-operated relief valve (PORV). Experimental data indicated that hot leg countercurrent natural 
circulation in PWRs with once-through SGs can be characterized by changes in structural temperatures. 
Results typical of data collected during the University of Maryland experiments are summarized in 
Table 2. Hot leg countercurrent modeling for plants with once-through SGs considered in this evaluation 
was based on benchmarks derived from those data, which were assumed to be close to conditions that 
could be expected during station blackout accidents.
3.  SCDAP/RELAP5 MODELING
A substantial number of SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses were completed during the course of this study in 
order to evaluate the potential for SGTRs as a result of severe reactor accidents in operating PWRs. 
Descriptions of the code, the operating PWRs that were analyzed, and the associated SCDAP/RELAP5 
models are provided in the sections that follow.
3.1. SCDAP/RELAP5
SCDAP/RELAP5 is a light water reactor (LWR) transient analysis computer code that is currently 
being developed at the INEEL. It can be used to simulate a very wide variety of system transients of inter-
est in LWR safety. The core, RCS, secondary systems (including feedwater and steam turbine trains), aux-
iliary systems, pumps, valves, and all system controls can be simulated.
SCDAP/RELAP5 development includes incorporation of models from the SCDAP,5 TRAP-MELT,6
and COUPLE7 codes into the RELAP58 code. SCDAP models provide coding for simulation of the reactor 
core. TRAP-MELT models serve as the basis for simulation of fission product release, transport, and dep-
osition. COUPLE models provide coding to allow detailed two-dimensional, finite-element heat transfer 
calculations at user-specified locations. (Detailed thermal simulation is typically used to represent lower 
head regions where molten core materials may collect.) And finally, RELAP5 models allow simulation of 
fluid thermal-hydraulic behavior throughout the LWR system, as well as the thermal behavior of structures 
outside the core. Feedbacks between the various parts of the code are developed to provide an integral 
analysis capability. For example, changes in coolant flow area associated with ballooning of fuel rod clad-
ding are taken into consideration in core thermal-hydraulics.
RELAP5 uses a one-dimensional, two-fluid, nonequilibrium, six-equation thermal-hydraulic model 
with a simplified capability to treat multidimensional flows. This model provides continuity, momentum, 
and energy equations for both liquid and vapor phases within a control volume. The energy equation con-
tains source terms that link the thermal-hydraulic model to the heat structure conduction model by a con-
vective heat transfer formulation. The code contains special process models for critical flow, abrupt area 
changes, branching, crossflow junctions, pumps, accumulators, valves, core neutronics, and control sys-
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tems. A generalized creep rupture model, which accounts for the cumulative effects of pressure and tem-
perature induced stresses, is also included for prediction of pressure boundary failures. The creep rupture 
model can be applied to any RELAP5 heat structure or to any part of any structure represented by a finite-
element COUPLE mesh. The creep rupture model, which provides critical insight into the potential for 
SGTR, uses a Larsen-Miller formulation to estimate when the combined pressure/temperature effects will 
lead to failure of each identified component.
SCDAP components simulate core disruption by modeling heatup, geometry changes, and material 
relocation. Detailed modeling of cylindrical and slab heat structures is allowed. Thus, fuel rods, control 
rods and blades, instrument tubes, and flow shrouds can be represented. Models in SCDAP calculate fuel 
and cladding temperatures, zircaloy oxidation, hydrogen generation, cladding ballooning and rupture, fuel 
and cladding liquefaction, flow and freezing of the liquefied materials, and release of fission products. 
Fragmentation of fuel rods during reflood is also calculated. Oxidation of the inside surface of the fuel rod 
cladding is calculated for ballooned and ruptured cladding. Interactions between molten core material and 
any surrounding fluid are explicitly modeled. Debris formation and behavior in the reactor vessel lower 
head and the resultant thermal attack on the lower head structure by the relocated material are also treated.
Version 8dl of SCDAP/RELAP5, with updates, was used to complete all analyses described in this 
report. The updates included error corrections that have been added to subsequent versions and model 
changes to improve the predictive capabilities of the code. The most significant model changes included 
logic to refine the calculation of molten debris/lower head interaction and the addition of code updates to 
treat the combined effects of forced and free (mixed) convection. (It should be noted, however, that the 
mixed convection coding was not in place for some of the earliest analyses completed in this evaluation as 
discussed in Section 5.)
3.2.  Analyzed PWRs and Associated SCDAP/RELAP5 Models
Operating PWRs include plants designed by Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, and Babcock & 
Wilcox. All operating PWRs use either U-tube or once-through SGs. PWRs with U-tube SGs include 
plants designed by Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering while all operating PWRs with once-
through SGs were designed by Babcock & Wilcox. Westinghouse PWRs have either two, three, or four 
primary coolant loops. All Combustion Engineering and Babcock & Wilcox PWRs have a “2x4” design, 
where two hot legs carry primary flows from the reactor vessel (to two SGs) and four cold legs return those 
flows to the vessel. In this evaluation, Surry and Zion PWRs were used to represent Westinghouse three 
and four loop plants, respectively. Calvert Cliffs and Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO2) PWRs were 
used to represent Combustion Engineering plants with and without pressurizer PORVs, respectively. 
Finally, Babcock & Wilcox plants were represented by the Oconee PWR. SCDAP/RELAP5 models for 
those plants are described in sections that follow.
3.2.1.  Surry PWR
The Surry PWR was used to represent Westinghouse three-loop plants in this evaluation. Surry is rated 
at 2441 MWt based on a core of 157 15x15 assemblies with an active fuel height of approximately 3.66 m.
Each of the three primary coolant loops contain a hot leg, a U-tube SG, a RCP, and a cold leg. A single 
pressurizer is attached to the hot leg piping in one of the loops. The pressurizer surge line and the hot/cold 
leg piping are made of stainless steel. The SG U-tubes are made of inconel. Two PORVs, with a combined 
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capacity of 45.1 kg/s, are used to relieve excess RCS pressure from the top of the pressurizer. Pressurizer 
safety relief valves (SRVs) are also available to handle excursions exceeding PORV capacity. One accu-
mulator, with 29.4 m3 (29,100 kg) of borated water at 322 K, is attached to each cold leg. The accumula-
tors, which are initially pressurized to 4.24 MPa by a nitrogen cover gas, are the only operational part of 
the ECCS (emergency core cooling system) during a station blackout. A large, dry, subatmospheric con-
tainment building surrounds the reactor systems.
SCDAP/RELAP5 nodalizations representing those features of the Surry PWR, including pertinent por-
tions of the secondary systems, are shown in Figures 3 and 4. (The two non-pressurizer loops are not 
shown but they were modeled separately with nodalizations similar to that shown in Figure 4.) Shaded 
areas represent core structures, cross-hatched areas represent all other pipe/vessel structures, and the 
remaining regions represent the hydrodynamic volume within the plant.
Nodalizations shown in Figures 3 and 4 were used from station blackout initiation until the time hot 
leg piping was drained. That approach was adequate for simulation of both in-vessel and full-loop natural 
circulation flows that could potentially develop during that period. Thereafter, the nodalization shown in 
Figure 5 was used in place of the Figure 4 nodalization. That substitution provided the additional flow 
paths needed to simulate hot leg countercurrent natural circulation, which can develop only after the hot 
legs are voided.
The nodalization shown in Figure 5 was developed to accommodate both full-loop and hot leg counter-
current natural circulation in case RCP loop seals clear. That was accomplished using RELAP5 servo 
valves to connect (a) the split hot leg to the split SG inlet plenum, (b) the split SG inlet plenum to the split 
SG tube bundle, and (c) the split SG tube bundle to the SG outlet plenum; for a total of ten locations in 
each primary coolant loop. The valves were configured with two sets of loss coefficients; one set consis-
tent with those used to model normal plant operation and one set necessary for appropriate simulation of 
hot leg countercurrent natural circulation based on Westinghouse experimental data. All other losses in the 
loop network were unaltered relative to those used for normal plant operation (i.e., equivalent to those used 
in the nodalization shown in Figure 4). If the horizontal portion of the RCP loop seal in a given loop is full 
of liquid, control logic directs the use of countercurrent loss coefficients in all servo valves in that loop. 
Alternately, if voids begin to form in the horizontal portion of the RCP loop seal, control logic directs a 
loss coefficient transition to values used for normal plant operation. As a result, both full-loop and counter-
current natural circulation flows should be appropriately calculated in each loop if/when transient loop 
conditions change. (Since it may have been a possibility, it should be noted that the nodalization shown in 
Figure 5 was not used to simulate the entire transient because requirements for computation and output 
would be significantly increased and because the simplistic control logic, as described above, was assumed 
to be inadequate.)
A horizontal section of the surge line in the Surry PWR connects to the centerline of the horizontal hot 
leg pipe. That orientation required a surge line split, as indicated in Figure 6, to represent potential counter-
current surge line flow in a fashion similar to the rest of the loop piping. The associated valves (numbered 
463 and 465 in Figure 6) were configured to open and close with the pressurizer PORV. As a result, the 
valves prevent hot to cold (top to bottom) hot leg communication when the PORV is closed and they allow 
both hot and cold hot leg flow streams to be drawn into both halves of the surge line when the PORV is 
opened. Preventing hot to cold communication when the valves are closed is consistent with experimental 
results indicating that interaction between hot leg flows is minimal during countercurrent natural circula-
tion. Furthermore, countercurrent natural circulation is interrupted as fluid from the core tends to flow in 
both halves of the split hot leg toward the split surge line when the PORV opens. It is reasonable to expect 
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a high degree of mixing as the flow streams reach the entrance to the surge line and respond to the large 
pressure differential generated by the open PORV. Valves 463 and 465 were opened with the PORV as a 
way to approximate conditions that would result from that mixing. Input was also needed in the model to 
calculate creep rupture of the stainless steel surge line (numbered 455-2 in Figure 5), all three stainless 
steel hot legs (numbered 400-1 in Figure 5 and at 200-1 and 300-1 in non-pressurizer loops that are not 
shown), and the hottest inconel SG U-tubes (numbered 408-1 in Figure 5 and at 208-1 and 308-1 in non-
pressurizer loops that are not shown).
The Surry PWR model included only a simple two volume representation of containment (numbered 
449-1 and 449-2 in Figures 4 and 5), which was not expected to adequately calculate condensation of pri-
mary effluent. Consequently, reasonable prediction of containment pressure was not expected. To resolve 
that problem, containment pressure was not allowed to increase above 0.2 MPa, based on results from con-
tainment scoping calculations.
The SCDAP/RELAP5 modeling approach outlined in the foregoing was originally developed using 
results from the Westinghouse low pressure experiments.9 However, all Surry analyses completed in this 
evaluation were based on benchmarks derived from the high pressure results (listed in Table 1) because 
those results were assumed to be more applicable to conditions that would be expected during station 
blackout accidents. With the exception of the servo valve refinement, additional details regarding the natu-
ral circulation modeling approach and its evolution are outlined in Reference 10. Servo valves were added 
in this evaluation only after Surry analyses were identified that appeared to have a high probability for sus-
tained RCP loop seal clearing. It then became important to be able to simulate transition from hot leg coun-
tercurrent to full-loop natural circulation. Consequently, the earliest Surry analyses completed in this 
evaluation did not include the servo valves while subsequent analyses incorporated that refinement. Surry 
analyses with and without the servo valve modeling refinement are identified in Section 5.
3.2.2.  Zion PWR
The Zion PWR was used to represent Westinghouse four-loop plants in this evaluation. Zion is rated at 
3250 MWt based on a core of 193 15x15 assemblies with an active fuel height of approximately 3.66 m.
Each of the four primary coolant loops contain a hot leg, a U-tube SG, a RCP, and a cold leg. A single 
pressurizer is attached to the hot leg piping in one of the loops. The pressurizer surge line and the hot/cold 
leg piping are made of stainless steel. The SG U-tubes are made of inconel. Two PORVs, with a combined 
capacity of 52.9 kg/s, are used to relieve excess RCS pressure from the top of the pressurizer. Pressurizer 
SRVs are also available to handle excursions exceeding PORV capacity. One accumulator, with 25.4 m3
(25,100 kg) of borated water at 325 K, is attached to each cold leg. The accumulators, which are initially 
pressurized to 4.24 MPa by a nitrogen cover gas, are the only operational part of the ECCS during a station 
blackout. A large, dry containment building surrounds the reactor systems.
SCDAP/RELAP5 nodalizations representing those features of the Zion PWR, including pertinent por-
tions of the secondary systems, are shown in Figures 7 and 8. (The three non-pressurizer loops are not 
shown but they were modeled separately with nodalizations similar to that shown in Figure 8.) Shaded 
areas represent core structures, cross-hatched areas represent all other pipe/vessel structures, and the 
remaining regions represent the hydrodynamic volume within the plant.
The approach used to model Zion was similar to the modeling of Surry (as outlined in Section 3.2.1).
Specifically, nodalizations shown in Figures 7 and 8 were used from station blackout initiation until the 
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time hot leg piping was drained in order to accommodate the potential for both in-vessel and full-loop nat-
ural circulation. Thereafter, the nodalization shown in Figure 9 was used in place of the Figure 8 nodaliza-
tion to provide the additional flow paths needed if hot leg countercurrent natural circulation develops. In 
addition, the nodalization shown in Figure 9 utilized the RELAP5 servo valve refinement as described for 
Surry to accommodate full-loop natural circulation if RCP loop seals clear. That refinement was used in all 
Zion analyses completed in this evaluation. (Like Surry modeling, the nodalization shown in Figure 9 was 
not used to simulate the entire transient because requirements for computation and output would be signif-
icantly increased and because the associated simplistic control logic was assumed to be inadequate.)
The Zion surge line is angled upward from its connection to the upper half of the horizontal hot leg, 
which is different than the Surry surge line connection. A split is not required for the Zion orientation 
because any potential for surge line countercurrent natural circulation is eliminated since the surge line 
generally sees only the hottest vapor in the top of the hot leg. However, valves numbered 155 and 156 in 
Figure 9 were needed to accommodate pressurizer draining and the mixing that would be expected when 
the pressurizer PORV opens. Specifically, while the pressurizer drained and the PORV was closed, control 
logic kept Valve 156 open and Valve 155 closed. Consequently, all liquid draining from the pressurizer 
appropriately flowed into the bottom half of the split hot leg. After pressurizer dryout, Valve 155 opened 
and Valve 156 closed whenever the PORV was closed. The surge line was appropriately exposed to the 
hottest flow stream under those conditions. And finally, control logic opened both valves whenever the 
PORV was opened. Countercurrent natural circulation is interrupted as fluid from the core tends to flow in 
both halves of the split hot leg toward the surge line when the PORV opens. It is reasonable to expect a 
high degree of mixing as the flow streams reach the entrance to the surge line and respond to the large 
pressure differential generated by the open PORV. Valves 155 and 156 were opened with the PORV as a 
way to approximate conditions that would result from that mixing. Model input was also needed to calcu-
late creep rupture of the stainless steel surge line (numbered 153-3 in Figure 9), all four stainless steel hot 
legs (numbered 100-1 in Figure 9 and at 200-1, 300-1, and 400-1 in non-pressurizer loops that are not 
shown), and the hottest inconel SG U-tubes (numbered 110-1 in Figure 9 and at 210-1, 310-1, and 410-1 in 
non-pressurizer loops that are not shown).
Like Surry, containment pressure was not allowed to increase above 0.2 MPa because the Zion model 
included only a simple single volume representation of containment (numbered 160 in Figures 8 and 9). In 
addition, all Zion countercurrent natural circulation modeling in analyses completed in this evaluation was 
based on benchmarks derived from Westinghouse high pressure results as listed in Table 1.
3.2.3.  Calvert Cliffs PWR
The Calvert Cliffs PWR was used to represent Combustion Engineering “2x4” plants with pressurizer 
PORVs in this evaluation. Calvert Cliffs is rated at 2700 MWt based on a core of 217 14x14 assemblies 
with an active fuel height of approximately 3.47 m. Both primary coolant loops contain a hot leg, a U-tube 
SG, two RCPs, and two cold legs. A single pressurizer is attached to the hot leg piping in one of the loops. 
The pressurizer surge line is made of stainless steel, the hot/cold leg piping is made of carbon steel with a 
stainless steel lining, and the SG U-tubes are made of inconel. Two PORVs, with a combined capacity of 
38.6 kg/s, are used to relieve excess RCS pressure from the top of the pressurizer. Pressurizer SRVs are 
also available to handle excursions exceeding PORV capacity. One accumulator, with 32.9 m3 (32,800 kg) 
of borated water at 300 K, is attached to each cold leg. The accumulators, which are initially pressurized to 
1.48 MPa by a nitrogen cover gas, are the only operational part of the ECCS during a station blackout. A 
large, dry containment building surrounds the reactor systems.
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SCDAP/RELAP5 nodalizations representing those features of the Calvert Cliffs PWR, including perti-
nent portions of the secondary systems, are shown in Figures 10 and 11. Shaded areas represent core struc-
tures, cross-hatched areas represent all other pipe/vessel structures, and the remaining regions represent the 
hydrodynamic volume within the plant.
The approach used to model Calvert Cliffs was similar to the modeling of Surry (as outlined in 
Section 3.2.1). Specifically, nodalizations shown in Figures 10 and 11 were used from station blackout ini-
tiation until the time hot leg piping was drained in order to accommodate the potential for both in-vessel 
and full-loop natural circulation. Thereafter, the nodalization shown in Figure 12 was used in place of the 
Figure 11 nodalization to provide the additional flow paths needed if hot leg countercurrent natural circula-
tion develops. In addition, the nodalization shown in Figure 12 utilized the RELAP5 servo valve refine-
ment as described for Surry to accommodate full-loop natural circulation if RCP loop seals clear. That 
refinement was used in all Calvert Cliffs analyses completed in this evaluation. (Like Surry modeling, the 
nodalization shown in Figure 12 was not used to simulate the entire transient because requirements for 
computation and output would be significantly increased and because the associated simplistic control 
logic was assumed to be inadequate.)
Like Zion, the Calvert Cliffs surge line is angled upward from its connection to the upper half of the 
horizontal hot leg. A split is not required for that orientation because any potential for surge line counter-
current natural circulation is eliminated since the surge line generally sees only the hottest vapor in the top 
of the hot leg. However, valves numbered 601 and 603 in Figure 12 were needed to accommodate pressur-
izer draining and the mixing that would be expected when the pressurizer PORV opens. Specifically, while 
the pressurizer drained and the PORV was closed, control logic kept Valve 603 open and Valve 601 
closed. Consequently, all liquid draining from the pressurizer appropriately flowed into the bottom half of 
the split hot leg. After pressurizer dryout, Valve 601 opened and Valve 603 closed whenever the PORV 
was closed. The surge line was appropriately exposed to the hottest flow stream under those conditions. 
And finally, control logic opened both valves whenever the PORV was opened. Countercurrent natural cir-
culation is interrupted as fluid from the core tends to flow in both halves of the split hot leg toward the 
surge line when the PORV opens. It is reasonable to expect a high degree of mixing as the flow streams 
reach the entrance to the surge line and respond to the large pressure differential generated by the open 
PORV. Valves 601 and 603 were opened with the PORV as a way to approximate conditions that would 
result from that mixing. Model input was also needed to calculate creep rupture of the stainless steel surge 
line (numbered 600-3 in Figure 12), both carbon steel hot legs (numbered 105-1 and 205-1 in Figure 12),
and the hottest inconel SG U-tubes (numbered 125-1 and 225-1 in Figure 12).
Like Surry, containment pressure was not allowed to increase above 0.2 MPa because the Calvert 
Cliffs model included only a simple single volume representation of containment (numbered 890 in 
Figures 11 and 12). In addition, all Calvert Cliffs countercurrent natural circulation modeling in analyses 
completed in this evaluation was based on benchmarks derived from Westinghouse high pressure results as 
listed in Table 1.
3.2.4.  ANO2 PWR
The ANO2 PWR was used to represent Combustion Engineering “2x4” plants without pressurizer 
PORVs in this evaluation. Although Calvert Cliffs was selected as representative of Combustion Engineer-
ing plants, ANO2 was also included because it has a relatively high power density and because it is one of 
seven Combustion Engineering plants without pressurizer PORVs. Both factors may contribute to the 
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potential for SGTR. Specifically, a high power density may accelerate core damage progression and the 
corresponding heatup. In addition, SG tubes (and other RCS pressure boundaries) may be exposed to 
higher pressures in the absence of PORVs because pressure is controlled via pressurizer SRVs, which 
operate with relatively high set points.
ANO2 is rated at 2815 MWt based on a core of 177 16x16 assemblies with an active fuel height of 
approximately 3.81 m. Both primary coolant loops contain a hot leg, a U-tube SG, two RCPs, and two cold 
legs. A single pressurizer is attached to the hot leg piping in one of the loops. The pressurizer surge line is 
made of stainless steel, the hot/cold leg piping is made of carbon steel with a stainless steel lining, and the 
SG U-tubes are made of inconel. ANO2 has no PORVs, but it does have two SRVs for relief of excess 
RCS pressure from the top of the pressurizer. The SRVs have a combined capacity of 99.5 kg/s. One accu-
mulator, with 44.7 m3 (44,200 kg) of borated water at 322 K, is attached to each cold leg. The accumula-
tors, which are initially pressurized to 4.31 MPa by a nitrogen cover gas, are the only operational part of 
the ECCS during a station blackout. A large, dry containment building surrounds the reactor systems.
SCDAP/RELAP5 nodalizations representing those features of the ANO2 PWR, including pertinent 
portions of the secondary systems, are shown in Figures 13 and 14. Shaded areas represent core structures, 
cross-hatched areas represent all other pipe/vessel structures, and the remaining regions represent the 
hydrodynamic volume within the plant.
The approach used to model ANO2 was similar to the modeling of Surry (as outlined in Section 3.2.1).
Specifically, nodalizations shown in Figures 13 and 14 were used from station blackout initiation until the 
time hot leg piping was drained in order to accommodate the potential for both in-vessel and full-loop nat-
ural circulation. Thereafter, the nodalization shown in Figure 15 was used in place of the Figure 14 nodal-
ization to provide the additional flow paths needed if hot leg countercurrent natural circulation develops. 
However, all ANO2 analyses were completed during the early phase of this evaluation. Consequently, the 
RELAP5 servo valve refinement as described for Surry was not included in the ANO2 model. As a result, 
some loss of fidelity is expected if full loop natural circulation happens to develop after the nodalization 
shown in Figure 15 is introduced.
Like Zion, the ANO2 surge line is angled upward from its connection to the upper half of the horizon-
tal hot leg. A split is not required for that orientation because any potential for surge line countercurrent 
natural circulation is eliminated since the surge line generally sees only the hottest vapor in the top of the 
hot leg. However, valves numbered 157 and 159 in Figure 15 were needed to accommodate pressurizer 
draining and the mixing that would be expected when the pressurizer PORV opens. Specifically, while the 
pressurizer drained and the PORV was closed, control logic kept Valve 159 open and Valve 157 closed. 
Consequently, all liquid draining from the pressurizer appropriately flowed into the bottom half of the split 
hot leg. After pressurizer dryout, Valve 157 opened and Valve 159 closed whenever the PORV was closed. 
The surge line was appropriately exposed to the hottest flow stream under those conditions. And finally, 
control logic opened both valves whenever the PORV was opened. Countercurrent natural circulation is 
interrupted as fluid from the core tends to flow in both halves of the split hot leg toward the surge line 
when the PORV opens. It is reasonable to expect a high degree of mixing as the flow streams reach the 
entrance to the surge line and respond to the large pressure differential generated by the open PORV. 
Valves 157 and 159 were opened with the PORV as a way to approximate conditions that would result 
from that mixing. Model input was also needed to calculate creep rupture of the stainless steel surge line 
(numbered 155-5 in Figure 15), both carbon steel hot legs (numbered 210-1 and 220-1 in Figure 15), and 
the hottest inconel SG U-tubes (numbered 301-1 and 331-1 in Figure 15).
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Like Surry, containment pressure was not allowed to increase above 0.2 MPa because the ANO2 
model included only a simple single volume representation of containment (numbered 890 in Figures 14
and 15). In addition, all ANO2 countercurrent natural circulation modeling in analyses completed in this 
evaluation was based on benchmarks derived from Westinghouse high pressure results as listed in Table 1.
3.2.5.  Oconee PWR
The Oconee PWR was used to represent Babcock & Wilcox “2x4” plants in this evaluation. Oconee is 
rated at 2568 MWt based on a core of 177 15x15 assemblies with an active fuel height of approximately 
3.57 m. Both primary coolant loops contain a hot leg, a once-through SG, two RCPs, and two cold legs. A 
single pressurizer is attached to the hot leg piping in one of the loops. The pressurizer surge line is made of 
stainless steel, the hot/cold leg piping is made of carbon steel with a stainless steel lining, and the SG tubes 
are made of inconel. One PORV, with a capacity of 13.5 kg/s, can be used to relieve excess RCS pressure 
from the top of the pressurizer. Pressurizer SRVs are also available to handle excursions exceeding PORV 
capacity. A core flood tank, with 60.9 m3 (60,800 kg) of borated water at 300 K, is attached near the top of 
the reactor vessel downcomer. The core flood tank, which is initially pressurized to 4.08 MPa by a nitrogen 
cover gas, is the only operational part of the ECCS during a station blackout. A large, dry containment 
building surrounds the reactor systems.
SCDAP/RELAP5 nodalizations representing those features of the Oconee PWR, including pertinent 
portions of the secondary systems, are shown in Figures 16 and 17. Shaded areas represent core structures, 
cross-hatched areas represent all other pipe/vessel structures, and the remaining regions represent the 
hydrodynamic volume within the plant.
Nodalizations shown in Figures 16 and 17 were used from station blackout initiation until the time hot 
leg piping was drained. That approach was adequate for simulation of both in-vessel and full-loop natural 
circulation flows that could potentially develop during that period. Thereafter, the nodalization shown in 
Figure 18 was used in place of the Figure 17 nodalization. That substitution provided the additional flow 
paths needed to simulate hot leg countercurrent natural circulation, which can develop only after the hot 
legs are voided.
The nodalization shown in Figure 18 was developed to accommodate both full-loop and hot leg coun-
tercurrent natural circulation in case RCP loop seals clear. That was accomplished using RELAP5 servo 
valves to connect (a) the hot leg crossover (from pipe 107 to pipe 108 and from pipe 207 to pipe 208), (b) 
the hot leg return (from pipe 113 to pipe 110-1 and from pipe 213 to pipe 210-1), and (c) the surge line 
return (from pipe 598 to pipe 106); for a total of five locations. The valves were configured with two sets 
of loss coefficients; one set consistent with those used to model normal plant operation and one set neces-
sary for appropriate simulation of hot leg countercurrent natural circulation based on University of Mary-
land data. All other losses in the loop network were unaltered relative to those used for normal plant 
operation (i.e., equivalent to those used in the nodalization shown in Figure 17). If the horizontal portion of 
the RCP loop seal in a given loop is full of liquid, control logic directs the use of countercurrent loss coef-
ficients in all servo valves in that loop. Alternately, if voids begin to form in the horizontal portion of the 
RCP loop seal, control logic directs a loss coefficient transition to values used for normal plant operation. 
As a result, both full-loop and countercurrent natural circulation flows should be calculated appropriately 
in each loop if/when transient loop conditions change. (Since it may have been a possibility, it should be 
noted that the nodalization shown in Figure 18 was not used to simulate the entire transient because 
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requirements for computation and output would be significantly increased and because the simplistic con-
trol logic, as described above, was assumed to be inadequate.)
A short horizontal section of the surge line in the Oconee PWR connects to the vertical section of the 
hot leg pipe. It was acceptable to lump that horizontal section into the pipe numbered 600-1 (as shown in 
Figure 17) prior to the onset of countercurrent natural circulation. However, experimental data indicated 
that a surge line split, as depicted in Figure 18, was needed to represent potential countercurrent flow. The 
crossover connection between pipes numbered 107 and 108 in Figure 18 was expected to help mix hot and 
cold hot leg vapor streams relative to the top of the surge line whenever the pressurizer PORV opens. 
Therefore, hot leg-to-surge line cross connections as shown for Surry in Figure 6 (and as discussed for all 
other models) did not appear to be necessary. However, model input was needed to calculate creep rupture 
of the stainless steel surge line (numbered 596 in Figure 18), both carbon steel hot legs (numbered 101 and 
201 in Figure 18), and the hottest inconel SG tubes (numbered 120-1 and 220-1 in Figure 18).
Like Surry, containment pressure was not allowed to increase above 0.2 MPa because the Oconee 
model included only a simple three volume representation of containment (numbered 949-1, 949-2, and 
949-3 in Figures 17 and 18). Countercurrent natural circulation modeling in all Oconee analyses completed 
in this evaluation was based on benchmarks derived from University of Maryland results as listed in 
Table 2. Reference 11 contains additional details regarding the Oconee natural circulation modeling.
4.  INDEPENDENT REVIEWS OF THE EVALUATION APPROACH
Independent review committee meetings were held in August 1996 to address the applicability of the 
Westinghouse natural circulation experimental data, the suitability of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code, and the 
adequacy of SCDAP/RELAP5 natural circulation modeling with respect to this evaluation. Review com-
mittee members included Dr. P. Griffith, a private consultant and former professor at Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, Dr. M. Ishii, a professor at Purdue University, and Dr. R. Viskanta, a professor at 
Purdue University. Dr. I. Catton, a member of Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), also 
attended the meetings as an observer. Findings and recommendations associated with review committee 
activities12,13,14 and conclusions subsequently offered by the ACRS15 are summarized below.
4.1. Applicability of Westinghouse Natural Circulation Data
The independent review committee concluded that the Westinghouse experiments were well designed 
and executed based on reports and presentations by the NRC, INEEL, and Fauske and Associates, Inc. 
(who provided design details of the experiments). Similar remarks were separately made by the ACRS. 
However, the reviewers indicated that uncertainties in the experimental parameters used to characterize hot 
leg countercurrent natural circulation had to be considered. In addition, the absence of radiation heat trans-
fer in the experiments and other shortcomings in experimental scaling were noted.
Experimental parameters used to characterize hot leg countercurrent natural circulation in PWRs with 
U-tube SGs include mixing fractions, a recirculation ratio, and the fraction of SG U-tubes that carry hot 
flow in the forward direction (see Table 1). As discussed in Section 5, analyses were performed to evaluate 
the impact of variations in individual parameters and the impact of simultaneous variations (or the syner-
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gistic effects) of those parameters. It was assumed that the completed sensitivity analyses adequately 
addressed uncertainties in the characteristic parameters with respect to the potential for SGTR.
The Westinghouse experiments were conducted at relatively low temperatures where radiation heat 
transfer was unimportant. That raised reviewer concerns about prototypicality and scalability because radi-
ation may not be negligible at the temperatures expected during severe accidents in operating PWRs. How-
ever, scaling of the experiments is an issue that has been studied extensively. The first scaling analyses 
were conducted by Westinghouse during both low pressure and high pressure experimental programs.2,3
The NRC subsequently sponsored an independent scaling review of the low pressure experiments by Was-
sel.16 The Wassel analysis was limited to evaluation of the low pressure tests without consideration of radi-
ation issues. Consequently, the NRC directed an additional review by Tung to evaluate the high pressure 
experiments including the treatment of radiation effects.17 The Tung evaluation was subject to an indepen-
dent review, where one review finding indicated the need for a more detailed analysis of radiation heat 
transfer. Accordingly, O’Brien completed a separate scaling report to examine radiation effects more 
closely.17 Several additional radiation and scaling-related issues were also raised and addressed in con-
junction with the subject evaluation.18,19,20
Results from the varied scaling reviews indicated that the absence of radiation introduced some scaling 
distortions in terms of low experimental core and SG heat transfer (compared to heat transfer expected in 
the prototype). Radiation-related scaling distortions were not found relative to transient heat transfer to 
unheated core structures or relative to heat transfer to the hot leg pipe. A separate assessment of the poten-
tial impact of radiation heat transfer between hot leg countercurrent vapor streams was addressed through 
SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses as outlined in Section 5. Results from those analyses indicated that vapor-to-
vapor radiation was not significant because heat transfer in the hot leg was dominated by convection from 
vapor to the pipe wall.
Other scaling distortions were introduced by the configuration of the experimental apparatus. For 
example, the experimental SG tube diameter (of 0.305 in) was larger than the one-seventh scale would 
have dictated (~0.775/7 = 0.111 in), flow resistance in the experimental core was somewhat low, and upper 
plenum heat sinks in the experimental vessel were somewhat large. The concession on experimental SG 
tube size was presumably driven by practical problems associated with the fabrication of relatively-long 
small-diameter tubes and the assembly of such tubes into a U-tube geometry. However, Westinghouse did 
ensure the appropriate scaling of experimental SG flow and SG heat capacity. Natural circulation flow 
rates in the core of an operating PWR would be smaller than predicted from direct scaling of the Westing-
house data because experimental core resistances were somewhat low and experimental upper plenum heat 
sinks were somewhat large, although reasons for that discrepancy is unknown.
In spite of scaling discrepancies, the Westinghouse experiments are quite useful in two major respects. 
First, the experiments clearly demonstrated the robustness of the natural circulation flow patterns including 
flows upward through the center of the core and downward through the core periphery, the countercurrent 
flows in the hot legs, and the participation of the SG tubes for U-tube designs. Those flow patterns were 
demonstrated to persist over a broad range of conditions in tests using water, low pressure SF6, and high 
pressure SF6. Furthermore, after completion of all of the varied reviews, there is no evidence to indicate 
that the basic phenomenology of hot leg countercurrent natural circulation was altered by scaling discrep-
ancies. It is therefore reasonable to expect that similar natural circulation flow patterns would develop dur-
ing a severe accident in an operating PWR with U-tube SGs. And second, the experimental results, while 
not representative of the scaled natural circulation flows and heat transfer rates of an operating PWR in 
every detail, do provide a data base for code validation. In fact, RELAP5 simulations of selected experi-
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ments were completed and the code results were found to be in reasonable agreement with the data. Confi-
dence is therefore gained in code simulation of similar natural circulation patterns in operating PWRs.
It is also worth noting that the original SCDAP/RELAP5 model was developed without reliance on 
scaling of experimental results. Instead, Westinghouse experiments were used as a means for validation of 
the COMMIX code results. Once confidence was established in COMMIX capabilities, SCDAP/RELAP5 
models were developed by direct comparison to COMMIX results as outlined in Reference 10.
4.2. Suitability of SCDAP/RELAP5
The independent review committee concluded that SCDAP/RELAP5 is capable of modeling natural 
circulation in PWRs under severe accident conditions for the purpose of calculating the relative timing of 
RCS component failures in order to assess the SGTR potential. After consideration of the independent 
review committee findings, the ACRS concurred that “it [SCDAP/RELAP5] can be used for the analyses 
required to support the development of the steam generator integrity rule”. Those conclusions were at least 
partially based on the fact that SCDAP/RELAP5 was shown to be capable of reproducing major trends in 
the Westinghouse experiments and that agreement between data and code predictions was satisfactory. 
Furthermore, code predictions from transient initiation through core oxidation and the onset of core degra-
dation were acknowledged to be reliable, which generally covers the period of interest in this evaluation. 
However, reviewers indicated that refinement was warranted in the calculation of convection heat transfer.
SCDAP/RELAP5 normally calculates forced and free convection heat transfer coefficients for either 
laminar or turbulent flow (as appropriate) and then uses the larger value. Results from some of the earliest 
analyses performed in this evaluation indicated that natural circulation flows through the SGs were gener-
ally turbulent. The largest coefficients for that flow regime were found to be those generated using the Dit-
tus-Boelter correlation. The reviewers argued that a correlation for fully-developed turbulent forced 
convection inside pipes may not provide the best heat transfer simulation for natural circulation in the SGs. 
Accordingly, the code was modified by the addition of a mixed convection heat transfer capability, which 
combines the effects of both forced and free convection. A comparison of results for the ANO2 PWR with 
and without the mixed convection update indicated that ex-vessel temperatures were relatively insensitive 
to the modification because the predicted contribution from free convection effects was relatively small.21
The code modification was retained, however, because it extended code applicability and that added capa-
bility could be more important in other transients. As a result, all but the earliest analyses performed in this 
evaluation were completed with the mixed convection update. Analyses completed prior to the addition of 
the update are identified in Section 5.
4.3.  Adequacy of SCDAP/RELAP5 Modeling
The independent review committee acknowledged the completion of a significant number of 
SCDAP/RELAP5 calculations along with an indication that the code had been applied correctly in this 
evaluation. However, the committee also recommended non-dimensionalization so that results from West-
inghouse experiments and results from SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses could be directly compared; sensitivity 
studies to evaluate uncertainties associated with heat transfer coefficients and the other parameters that 
characterize hot leg countercurrent natural circulation in PWRs with U-tube SGs, including the synergistic 
effects associated with varying several parameters at a time; and analyses to evaluate conjugate heat trans-
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fer effects in the split hot leg model (consisting of the combination of fluid-to-wall heat transfer, fluid-to-
fluid heat transfer, and circumferential conduction around the hot leg pipe wall).
The committee was concerned that conclusions were not clear and definitive based on the results avail-
able at the time of the review meetings. Non-dimensionalization (in terms of some convenient temperature 
difference, temperature ramp, or other suitable basis) was recommended as a way to compare code results 
and experimental data so that more definitive conclusions could be developed. However, non-dimensional-
ization was not performed. Instead, a broader series of sensitivity analyses for a broader spectrum of oper-
ating PWRs was completed. Among other issues, uncertainties in heat transfer coefficients, the parameters 
that characterize hot leg countercurrent natural circulation, and conjugate heat transfer effects in the split 
hot leg model were considered in the SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses as discussed in the following section.
5.  SCDAP/RELAP5 ANALYSES
All SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses performed during this evaluation were based on station blackout acci-
dents (and variations thereof) because those accidents are considered to be one of the more likely scenarios 
leading to natural circulation at temperatures and pressures that could threaten SG tube integrity (as well as 
the integrity of other vulnerable RCS pressure boundaries). The particular station blackout accident con-
sidered is generally designated TMLB’, which includes an immediate loss of all alternating current (AC) 
power and all feedwater. An additional assumption of accident progression without recovery allows the 
potential for development of natural circulation flows (including in-vessel, full-loop, and hot leg counter-
current modes as discussed in Section 2). All SCDAP/RELAP5 models used in this evaluation appropri-
ately accounted for the potential development of all natural circulation flows (as discussed in Section 3).
A TMLB’ accident is initiated by the loss of off-site power. On-site AC power is unavailable because 
diesel generators fail to start or fail to supply power. Decay heat removal cannot be maintained because 
there is no power for electrical feedwater pumps and steam driven auxiliary feedwater pumps fail to supply 
water. As the transient begins, control rod drives lose power, the reactor scrams, and the main feedwater 
pumps and RCPs begin to coastdown. The flow of feedwater is reduced to zero before pump coastdown is 
complete because the main feedwater valves close quickly. The turbine stop valves then close, effectively 
isolating the SG secondaries. After isolation, SG pressures increase as a result of boiling associated with 
decay heat transfer until relief valves open. SG pressures are normally maintained between the opening 
and closing pressures of the relief valves thereafter. Decay heat transfer to the SGs is significantly reduced 
after secondary inventories are boiled away. RCS temperatures and pressures increase when decay heat 
removal is reduced until the pressurizer PORVs open. The RCS pressure is normally controlled by cyclic 
operation of the PORVs thereafter. However, the RCS pressure can be influenced by RCP seal leaks, 
which can develop following the loss of AC power and the associated loss of seal cooling water. After the 
RCS is heated to saturation, a high pressure boiloff begins, ultimately leading to core uncovery and heatup. 
Without recovery of power or equipment, the transient proceeds to severe core damage and melting.
A substantial number of SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses were performed to evaluate the potential for 
SGTR that could develop in operating PWRs as a result of natural circulation heating during TMLB’ acci-
dents (and variations thereof). Those analyses included “stand alone” loop simulations to evaluate uncer-
tainties associated with Westinghouse countercurrent natural circulation data and a large number of 
analyses for operating PWRs to determine if conditions associated with TMLB’ accidents could threaten 
SG tube integrity (and the integrity of other vulnerable RCS pressure boundaries). Operating PWRs were 
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represented by Surry, Zion, Calvert Cliffs, ANO2, and Oconee plants, thereby covering all existing PWR 
designs. All RCS pressure boundaries, including the SG tubes, were assumed to be defect free with respect 
to the prediction of RCS pressure boundary failures in all analyses. The remainder of this section contains 
descriptions of the specific analyses that were performed, explanations why each of the analyses were 
needed, and summaries of the associated SCDAP/RELAP5 results.
5.1. Stand Alone Loop Analyses
In this evaluation, all hot leg countercurrent natural circulation modeling for operating PWRs with 
U-tube SGs was based on Westinghouse experimental data. However, there is some variability in the data 
that characterize countercurrent natural circulation as indicated in Table 1. An understanding of the corre-
sponding tube heatup sensitivity was an important part of evaluating uncertainties relative to the potential 
for SGTR. Analyses were therefore needed to determine how SG U-tube heatup might be affected as a 
result of the experimental variability.
The needed analyses were based on a “stand alone” version of the Surry pressurizer loop (shown in 
Figure 5). The Surry loop was simplified through the use of time dependent junctions to represent the pres-
surizer PORVs, to connect the split hot legs to the reactor vessel, and to connect the top of the split hot leg 
to the hot side of the SG inlet plenum. Time dependent volumes were used to represent the reactor vessel 
and the RCP suction. The resulting nodalization, which allows the loop to “stand alone”, is shown in 
Figure 19. This approach provided a fast-running model that could be readily modified.
Time dependent junctions and volumes in the stand alone loop model were configured to use 
SCDAP/RELAP5 results derived from benchmarking a base case from the onset of hot leg countercurrent 
natural circulation (9200 s) through the time of surge line failure (15,350 s). The Base Case benchmark 
included 35% of the SG U-tubes participating in hot (forward) flow (or a hot/cold SG U-tube split of 
35%/65%), mixing fractions of 0.87, and a recirculation ratio of 1.9. Variations in the natural circulation 
parameters were then evaluated individually, while all other parameters (and the time dependent results 
derived from the Base Case benchmark) were held constant, as indicated by the matrix provided in 
Table 3. That calculation matrix was designed to cover the full range of experimental variability indicated 
in Table 1. (Although a recirculation ratio of 2.39 was needed to cover the experimental range and a maxi-
mum of only 2.25 was actually reached [in Case 7]. Reasons for that discrepancy will be explained below.)
5.1.1.  SG U-Tube Split Sensitivity
As indicated in Table 3, the number of tubes allowed to participate in hot (forward) flow in the SG 
U-tube split sensitivity analyses (Cases 1, 2, and 3) ranged from 29 to 61% (while all other conditions were 
held constant). That range covered the experimental variation listed in Table 1. A comparison of tempera-
tures for the hottest tubes in the Base Case and the SG U-tube split sensitivity analyses is provided in 
Figure 20. Results shown in the figure indicate that SG U-tube temperatures increase as the number of 
tubes participating in hot (forward) flow decreases. That occurs because tube temperatures must increase 
as the tube area decreases when decay heat transfer is constant. However, by 15,000 s (which was the end 
of all stand alone loop sensitivity analyses), the maximum temperature difference (between minimum and 
maximum tube splits) was no more than ~26 K. That is an insignificant difference considering all other 
uncertainties involved in the simulation of severe reactor accidents. Furthermore, the calculated tempera-
ture increases did not significantly increase tube creep damage, indicating that any potential for SGTR 
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would not develop until long after surge line failure (at 15,350 s) for the range of SG U-tube splits consid-
ered. Effects on SG U-tubes as a result of individual variations in the tube split are minimal based on those 
results.
5.1.2.  Mixing Fraction Sensitivity
Sensitivity analyses with mixing fractions of 0.76 and 0.89 were completed as outlined in Table 3 to 
cover the experimental variation listed in Table 1. A comparison of temperatures for the hottest tubes in the 
Base Case and the mixing fraction sensitivity analyses (Cases 4 and 5) is provided in Figure 21. Results 
shown in the figure indicate that SG U-tube temperatures increase as the mixing fraction decreases. That 
occurs because vapor temperatures entering the hot portion of the SG U-tube bundle increase as mixing in 
the SG inlet plenum is reduced. However, at the end of the sensitivity analyses (15,000 s), the maximum 
temperature difference (between minimum and maximum mixing fractions) was ~24 K. Again, that is an 
insignificant difference considering all other uncertainties involved in the simulation of severe reactor 
accidents, indicating that the effect on SG U-tubes as a result of individual variations in the mixing fraction 
is minimal.
5.1.3.  Recirculation Ratio Sensitivity
Sensitivity analyses with recirculation ratios of 1.69 and 2.25 were completed (while all other condi-
tions were held constant) as outlined in Table 3; although a recirculation ratio of 2.39 was needed to cover 
the experimental variation listed in Table 1. A ratio of 2.39 was not achieved because vapor temperatures 
entering the SG U-tubes were too low. Those temperatures, which affect the magnitude of the buoyancy 
driven flow, are functions of the mixing fraction (and other related parameters). A lower mixing fraction, 
which could have increased the vapor temperatures and the recirculation ratio, was not an option because 
all parameters, other than the variable being evaluated, were held constant by design. Given that discrep-
ancy, a comparison of temperatures for the hottest tubes in the Base Case and the recirculation ratio sensi-
tivity analyses (Cases 6 and 7) is provided in Figure 22. Results shown in the figure indicate that SG 
U-tube temperatures increase as the recirculation ratio increases. That occurs because heat transfer coeffi-
cients in the tubes increase as velocities increase. However, at the end of the sensitivity analyses 
(15,000 s), the maximum temperature difference (between minimum and maximum recirculation ratios 
considered) was no more that ~10 K. Based on trends in those results, it would appear that a recirculation 
ratio of 2.39 could result in SG U-tube temperatures that could be ~5 K higher, which would increase the 
maximum temperature difference over the full range to ~15 K. In either case, however, those are insignifi-
cant differences. Furthermore, those differences would not significantly increase tube creep damage, indi-
cating that any potential for SGTR would not develop until long after surge line failure (at 15,350 s) for the 
range of recirculation ratios considered. Based on those results, effects on SG U-tubes as a result of indi-
vidual variations in the recirculation ratio are minimal.
All of the foregoing stand alone loop analyses were completed before SCDAP/RELAP5 updates to 
treat mixed convection were developed. However, results from ANO2 scoping calculations indicate that 
those updates should not have any significant impact on SG tube heating.21 Furthermore, differences in SG 
U-tube temperatures are the results of interest, and similar differences would be expected as long as all 
analyses were completed either with or without use of the mixed convection updates. The servo valve 
refinement, as discussed in Section 3.2, was not needed because the time dependent results used in the 
analyses did not include RCP loop seal clearing. Since those conditions were fixed, loop seal clearing 
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could not occur in any of the stand alone loop analyses, which means that servo valve loss coefficient tran-
sitions (to full-loop flow values) were unnecessary. Additional information regarding the stand alone loop 
analyses is available for further reference in a previously issued document.22
5.2.  Initial Plant Analyses
Nine analyses for the Surry PWR (with Case SUR-01 through Case SUR-09 designations) and four 
analyses for the ANO2 PWR (with Case ANO2-01 through Case ANO2-04 designations) were completed 
in the initial stages of this evaluation. All of factors that could affect the potential for SGTR were not iden-
tified or completely understood at the time that these analyses were initiated. Consequently, these analyses 
were used to explore SGTR response in two different PWRs for a variety of different factors. It was 
assumed that this approach would provide results that could be used to guide additional analyses in terms 
of those factors with the largest impact on the potential for SGTR.
RCP seal leaks were among the factors that were considered. The following sections have been orga-
nized to discuss the initial Surry and ANO2 analyses in terms of those with and without RCP seal leaks 
because those leaks significantly alter plant response, the potential for loop seal clearing, and therefore, the 
potential for increased SG tube heating associated with full loop natural circulation. Other factors that were 
considered include SG secondary depressurization, RCS depressurization following predicted pressure 
boundary failures, the hot/cold SG tube split, and the treatment of upper plenum steel if it is predicted to 
melt. A summary description for each of the initial plant analyses is provided in Table 4. The table also 
identifies references to supporting documentation, if available.
It should be noted that there are a number of similarities between the Surry and ANO2 analyses, which 
will become apparent through the following discussions. Those similarities were intentional, thereby pro-
viding a way to explore the potential for SGTR relative to some basic design differences. Specifically, 
ANO2 has a higher core power density than Surry (at 97 versus 92 MW/m3, respectively) and ANO2 has a 
lower RCP loop seal depth than Surry (at 1.2 versus 1.7 m, respectively). In addition, ANO2 RCS pressure 
is normally controlled via pressurizer SRVs operating between 16.7 and 17.2 MPa while pressurizer 
PORVs operating between 15.7 and 16.2 MPa control the Surry RCS pressure.
5.2.1.  Surry Analyses without RCP Seal Leaks
Surry Case SUR-01 was the first plant analysis completed in this evaluation. As such, this particular 
analysis will be described in some detail in order to provide a foundation for the general conduct of this 
evaluation and the general nature of the plant response during a TMLB’ transient. Furthermore, all plant 
analyses share a number of similarities. By providing details for Surry Case SUR-01, it was assumed that 
descriptions of all other analyses can be summarized to emphasize only those highlights that are important 
relative to the potential for SGTR without any significant loss of understanding.
As indicated in Table 4, Case SUR-01 was performed without accident recovery and without operator 
actions, which basically means that feedwater is never restored and that no action is taken to try to mitigate 
accident progression. If upper plenum steel was predicted to melt, it was assumed that the molten steel 
would relocate into the lower head and quench to the lower head liquid temperature, given an adequate liq-
uid inventory. Hot leg countercurrent natural circulation was benchmarked at average values derived from 
Westinghouse steady state experiments (as specified in the table) before the analysis began. After the anal-
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ysis was completed, it was recognized that the process used to benchmark natural circulation biased heat 
transfer so that SG energy deposition levels were somewhat higher than levels established in previous 
analyses9, which could lead to some increase in SG tube temperatures. An adjustment was not made 
because differences were small and conservative relative to the potential for SGTR. Break initiation and 
the associated depressurization was not simulated following any predicted RCS pressure boundary failure. 
Instead, the calculation was allowed to proceed without a break in order to conservatively determine the 
timing associated with other potential RCS pressure boundary failures. That approach is conservative 
because the RCS pressure will remain high without break simulation, thereby providing the potential for 
subsequent failures at the earliest possible times. In addition, the potential for subsequent failures is 
increased because natural circulation heating will continue without the disruption that would otherwise be 
associated with an RCS pressure boundary failure.
In Surry Case SUR-01, the loss of AC power resulted in reactor scram and RCP trips at transient initi-
ation (at 0 s). In addition, SG isolation valves closed and feed water pumps tripped, effectively isolating 
the SG secondaries. The RCS pressure initially decreased from (the steady state value of) 15.9 MPa to 
about 14.5 MPa because core power dropped rapidly after scram while RCP coastdown was relatively 
gradual. A pressure increase (to about 15.7 MPa) then occurred as indicated in Figure 23 while full-loop 
natural circulation of primary liquid was established. Thereafter, the RCS pressure gradually decreased to 
about 14.8 MPa because full-loop natural circulation was effective in cooling the core by rejecting decay 
heat to SG secondary fluids.
SG secondary pressures in Surry Case SUR-01 increased (from initial values of about 5.4 MPa) as a 
result of heat transferred by full-loop natural circulation. Consequently, relief valves (RVs) in all three SGs 
were challenged by ~20 s when secondary pressures increased to opening pressures of 7.2 MPa. SG RVs in 
all loops were assumed to cycle normally to control secondary pressures between 6.9 and 7.2 MPa as indi-
cated in Figure 24. Note that a large number of valve cycles are required, particularly while SGs are in the 
process of drying out. The RCS pressure gradually increased as SG secondary liquids were boiled away. 
By 4980 s, the RCS pressure had increased to the pressurizer PORV opening set point of 16.2 MPa as 
shown in Figure 23. All secondary inventories were depleted shortly thereafter (by 5040 s).
The (steady state) RCS subcooled margin in Surry Case SUR-01 was basically maintained as long as 
some liquid remained in the SG secondaries. However, heat transfer from the RCS was substantially 
reduced after SG secondary dry out. With reduced heat transfer to the SGs and the continuous addition of 
core decay energy, the RCS inventory was ultimately heated to a saturated state. Addition of decay heat 
thereafter resulted in boiling of the RCS liquid in the core. By that time, vapor in the pressurizer dome had 
been vented and liquid was being discharged through the pressurizer PORV. Consequently, the volume 
expansion associated with boiling caused the RCS pressure to increase substantially above the pressurizer 
PORV set point as indicated in Figure 23. (It should be noted, however, that the pressurizer SRV was not 
challenged.) As boiling progressed, vapor collected in the top of the SG U-tubes, ending full-loop natural 
circulation of primary liquid by about 7760 s. Some vapor also made its way to the pressurizer PORV. The 
energy relieved by venting two-phase flow led to an RCS pressure reduction back to the range of 15.7 to 
16.2 MPa, as controlled by the pressurizer PORV.
Boiling in the core and venting through the pressurizer PORV led to depletion of the RCS inventory in 
Surry Case SUR-01. As indicated in Figure 25, the collapsed liquid level fell below the top of the fuel rods 
by 9030 s. Shortly thereafter, the hot legs voided and vapor in the core exit began to superheat, presenting 
conditions that could support development of hot leg countercurrent natural circulation. Accordingly, the 
calculation was stopped at 9205 s for loop renodalization needed for countercurrent simulation (i.e., the 
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nodalization used in each primary coolant loop, similar to that shown in Figure 4, was replaced with nodal-
ization similar to that shown in Figure 5). As indicated in Figure 25, core uncovery was complete by 
10,670 s. Oxidation of the uncovered core began by about 11,460 s.
Temperatures in the RCS piping in Surry Case SUR-01 increased as shown in Figure 26 as a result of 
heat transfer associated with natural circulation flows. Creep rupture of the pressurizer surge line at 
14,050 s, due to natural circulation heating, was predicted to be the first failure of the RCS pressure bound-
ary. Terms representing the cumulative creep damage of the surge line and other vulnerable RCS bound-
aries are shown in Figure 27. Surge line failure corresponds with the time when the associated creep 
damage term reached unity.
A break was not simulated at the time of surge line failure in Surry Case SUR-01. Instead, the calcula-
tion was allowed to proceed without a break in order to conservatively determine the timing associated 
with other potential RCS pressure boundary failures. Pressurizer loop hot leg creep rupture was accord-
ingly predicted at 15,110 s as indicated in Figures 26 and 27. Both non-pressurizer loop hot leg nozzles 
were predicted to fail shortly thereafter (at 15,670 s). However, SGTR was not predicted, even though sim-
ulation of surge line rupture was ignored, because the tubes remained relatively cool. The calculation was 
terminated at 18,900 s because surge line failure had already occurred (some 4850 s earlier) and creep 
damage of the SG tubes was essentially zero (as indicated in Figure 27). The potential for SGTR is low in 
this case based on those results. The timing of all ex-vessel failures in this analysis (and all other initial 
plant analyses) are summarized in Table 5 for easier reference. The sequence of key events for Surry 
Case SUR-01 is listed in Table 6. Those events, as just described, are typical of TMLB’ transients without 
RCS or SG secondary depressurization.
Surry Case SUR-02 was identical to Case SUR-01 except that a break was introduced in Case SUR-02
when the first RCS pressure boundary was predicted to fail. Comparing results from the two analyses was 
expected to provide insights into the modifications in natural circulation heating that could occur when the 
RCS is depressurized through a break.
Transient progression in Surry Case SUR-02 was identical to the progression of Case SUR-01 until 
surge line failure (at 14,050 s). At that time, a surge line break was introduced in Case SUR-02, resulting in 
rapid depressurization of the RCS and the end of pressurizer PORV cycling as shown in Figure 28. Accu-
mulator injection followed, providing water sufficient to reflood the active core by 14,350 s as shown in 
Figure 29. The reflood effectively arrested the heatup of the core and cooled the RCS piping as indicated in 
Figure 30. Core reheating did occur after the accumulator water was boiled away. However, energy associ-
ated with core reheating was primarily directed out the surge line break, which prevented any significant 
reheating of the RCS piping. A decision was made to terminate Case SUR-02 at 21,000 s because it was 
clear that additional RCS pressure boundary failures would be very unlikely. In fact, SGTR cannot occur if 
the surge line fails as predicted in this case because the SG tubes are subjected to compression loading as a 
result of RCS depressurization. SG tube collapse is possible under those conditions, but relatively high 
temperatures in conjunction with the compression loads would be required to generate that type of failure.
Results from Surry Cases SUR-01 and SUR-02 indicated that SGTR will not develop if normal pres-
sures are maintained in the SG secondaries. In Case SUR-01, SG tube differential pressures were limited to 
9.3 MPa because both RCS and SG secondary pressures were maintained, despite predictions that the 
surge line and hot leg nozzles would fail. SG tube heating was not severe enough to induce SGTR for that 
differential pressure. In Case SUR-02, the RCS was depressurized through a surge line break while SG 
secondary pressures were maintained. In that case, the SG tubes were subjected to compression loading, 
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which effectively eliminated the potential for SGTR. Based on those results, two changes were made in 
Surry Case SUR-03 relative to Case SUR-01.
The first change made in Surry Case SUR-03 involved the treatment of the SG secondaries. In 
Case SUR-01, it was assumed that all SG secondary relief valves (RVs) cycled as necessary to control sec-
ondary pressures (between 6.9 and 7.2 MPa). In Case SUR-03, it was assumed that the first SG secondary 
RV challenged would open and fail to close, resulting in secondary depressurization and an increased 
potential for SGTR in the affected SG.a Failure of a SG RV does not appear to be a unreasonable assump-
tion given the number of RV cycles required to maintain SG secondary pressures (see Figure 24). SG sec-
ondary pressures in Case SUR-03 consistent with failure of the first RV challenged are shown in 
Figure 31.
The second change made in Surry Case SUR-03 relative to Case SUR-01 affected the treatment of 
upper plenum steel if melting of that steel was predicted. In Case SUR-01, it was assumed that all upper 
plenum steel that was predicted to melt would relocate into the lower head and quench, given an adequate 
liquid inventory. In Case SUR-03, it was assumed that molten upper plenum steel would candle through 
the core and refreeze at some relatively cool location before reaching the lower head. Core temperatures 
conducive to refreezing could exist at locations above the vessel liquid level.
Temperatures of the RCS piping in Surry Case SUR-03 are shown in Figure 32. Heating associated 
with natural circulation flows led to creep rupture of the pressurizer surge line at 13,640 s, which was pre-
dicted to be the first failure of the RCS pressure boundary. SGTR in the pressurizer loop SG was predicted 
1010 s later (at 14,650 s). SG tube temperatures in Case SUR-03 were not substantially hotter than tube 
temperatures in Case SUR-01 as indicated through comparison of Figures 26 and 32. However, SGTR was 
predicted in Case SUR-03, but not in Case SUR-01, because the SG tube differential pressure increased 
from 9.3 to 16.2 MPa in Case SUR-03 as a result of the assumed SG secondary depressurization. The 
potential for SGTR is low in this case however, given that surge line failure was predicted 1010 s before 
tube failure.b
Surry Case SUR-04 was identical to Case SUR-02 except that SG secondary RV failure with the asso-
ciated secondary depressurization was considered in Case SUR-04. Comparing results from the two analy-
ses was expected to provide insights into the modifications in natural circulation heating that could occur 
with both RCS and SG secondary depressurization. Like Surry Case SUR-02, rapid RCS depressurization 
was followed by accumulator injection as a result of the break that was introduced in Surry Case SUR-04
a.  It is worth noting that the secondary RV associated with the SG attached to the pressurizer loop was 
always the first SG secondary RV challenged in this evaluation. That is because pressurizer PORV flows 
tend to keep vapor temperatures in the pressurizer loop somewhat hotter than vapor temperatures in the non-
pressurizer loops. Heat transfer to the pressurizer loop SG secondary is somewhat higher because of the hot-
ter vapor temperatures. Consequently, the pressurizer loop SG secondary is heated to the RV set point some-
what quicker than the non-pressurizer loop secondaries.
b. Surry Case SUR-03, and Surry Case SUR-06, were originally completed without code updates to treat 
mixed convection heat transfer.23 Both analyses were ultimately revised using a version of the code with 
mixed convection updates.24 The code was modified to treat mixed convection based on peer reviewer rec-
ommendations (see Section 4.2) and the modified code was used in all analyses performed after the recom-
mendations were made. Revisions of Cases SUR-03, and SUR-06, were completed so that comparisons with 
subsequent analyses could be made without concern that observed differences were related to the updates. 
All results presented here were taken from the revised analyses.
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at the time of surge line failure. Accumulator reflood effectively arrested the heatup of the core and cooled 
the RCS piping. Case SUR-04 results indicate that cooling was sufficient to prevent additional RCS pres-
sure boundary failures even though the secondary side of the pressurizer loop SG was depressurized. 
Therefore, results from Cases SUR-04 and SUR-02 indicate that additional RCS pressure boundary fail-
ures will not develop after the RCS is depressurized through an initial pressure boundary failure, with or 
without SG secondary depressurization.
Surry Case SUR-05 was identical to Case SUR-01 except that a hot/cold SG tube split of 53%/47% 
was simulated in Case SUR-05 as outlined in Table 4. (A tube split of 53%/47% is the average observed 
during Westinghouse high pressure transient tests.) SG U-tube temperatures for the two cases are com-
pared in Figure 33. As shown, SG tubes in Case SUR-05 were somewhat cooler than tubes in 
Case SUR-01, which is consistent with results from the stand alone loop analyses. Specifically, SG U-tube 
temperatures were found to decrease as the number of tubes participating in hot (forward) flow was 
increased. A close examination indicates that differences between Cases SUR-05 and SUR-01 are on the 
order of 10 to 20 K, which is approximately equivalent to differences observed in the stand alone loop 
analyses. Results from Cases SUR-05 and SUR-01 were essentially identical otherwise, indicating that 
changes in the SG tube split do not significantly affect general accident progression in cases without SG 
secondary depressurization.
As outlined in Table 4, the assumed hot/cold SG tube split was also the only difference between Surry 
Cases SUR-06 and SUR-03. Specifically, a hot/cold SG tube split of 53%/47% was simulated in 
Case SUR-06. RCS piping temperatures in Case SUR-06 were somewhat cooler than the corresponding 
piping temperatures in Case SUR-03, which was expected based on results from the stand alone loop anal-
yses and Surry Case SUR-05. Because RCS piping temperatures were somewhat cooler, surge line failure 
in Case SUR-06 at 13,730 s (as shown in Figure 34) was slightly delayed compared to surge line failure in 
Case SUR-03 at 13,640 s (as shown in Figure 32). Furthermore, SGTR in Case SUR-06 at 14,960 s was 
slightly delayed compared to SGTR in Case SUR-03 at 14,650 s (as indicated in the same figures and 
Table 5). Based on those results, SGTR could be delayed 220 s relative surge line failure if the fraction of 
SG tubes participating in forward (hot) flow during countercurrent natural circulation is increased from 35 
to 53% (and the surge line failure is not simulated when predicted). All other results were essentially iden-
tical, indicating that the SG tube split does not affect the general accident progression or adversely affect 
the potential for SGTR even if SG secondaries are depressurized. The sequence of key events for Surry 
Case SUR-06 is listed in Table 7. Those events are typical of TMLB’ transients with SG secondary depres-
surization.
Surry Case SUR-07 was identical to Case SUR-01 except that all three SG secondaries were assumed 
to depressurize through failed RVs. Multiple RV failures would be unlikely, but results should provide 
some indication how depressurization of multiple SG secondaries could affect the potential for SGTR. 
Decay heat transfer from the RCS to the SG secondaries was reduced in Case SUR-07 relative to 
Case SUR-01 because secondary inventories were depleted more rapidly with all SG RVs open. RCS pip-
ing temperatures heated more rapidly and creep ruptures of that piping were accelerated in Case SUR-07
because heat transfer to the secondaries was reduced. However, surge line failure was still predicted to be 
the first failure of the RCS pressure boundary as indicated in Table 5. Furthermore, surge line failure could 
be expected 1340 s before SGTR if the surge line failure is not simulated when predicted. Those results 
indicate that the potential for SGTR in this case is not adversely affected even if all SG secondaries are 
depressurized.
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5.2.2.  Surry Analyses with RCP Seal Leaks
RCP seal leaks were simulated in Surry Cases SUR-08 and SUR-09. The leak simulation was based on 
the expected behavior of Westinghouse RCP seals, which are used in the Surry plant.25 Specifically, West-
inghouse seals are expected to leak 21 gpm of subcooled water per RCP at nominal operating conditions if 
seal cooling water is lost.26 Subsequent seal degradation and failure is expected as a TMLB’ accident 
progresses because the seals are not designed for exposure to high temperature steam. The seals are partic-
ularly vulnerable to failure when fluid in the RCP reaches a saturated condition because seal faces tend to 
pop open as a result of two-phase flow instabilities. Although a specific leak rate is difficult to predict 
given possible variations in seal failure, a panel of experts concluded that 250 gpm per RCP is the most 
likely leak rate from Westinghouse pumps during a TMLB’ accident.27 Based on that information, a seal 
leak area equivalent to 21 gpm per RCP was introduced in Cases SUR-08 and SUR-09 at TMLB’ accident 
initiation since seal cooling water is lost when AC power is lost. The appropriate leak area was established 
for flow of saturated liquid at nominal conditions. Seal leak areas were subsequently increased from the 
equivalent of 21 gpm per RCP to the equivalent of 250 gpm per RCP at the time saturated conditions were 
reached at any of the pumps. Seal leaks of 250 gpm per RCP were assumed in both cases because the rate 
was considered likely and because the rate seemed large enough to potentially influence RCP loop seal 
clearing. The appropriate leak area was established for flow of saturated liquid at 16.0 MPa, corresponding 
with the average of the opening and closing set points of the pressurizer PORVs.
Surry Cases SUR-08 and SUR-09 differed only with respect to the treatment of upper plenum steel if 
melting of that steel was predicted. In Case SUR-08, it was assumed that all upper plenum steel that was 
predicted to melt would relocate into the lower head and quench, given an adequate liquid inventory. In 
Case SUR-09, it was assumed that molten upper plenum steel would candle through the core and refreeze 
at some relatively cool core location without quenching.
The first RCS pressure boundary failures in Surry Cases SUR-08 and SUR-09 were predicted to be hot 
leg failures, instead of the surge line failures that developed in all previous Surry cases, and SGTRs did not 
develop (see Table 5). Hot leg failures, rather than surge line failures, were predicted in Cases SUR-08 and 
SUR-09 because pressurizer PORV flow and therefore, surge line heating, was reduced as a result of flows 
through RCP seal leaks. SGTRs did not develop because the RCS was depressurized by the RCP seal 
leaks. Tube differential pressures were reduced to zero in pressurizer loop SGs and tube differential pres-
sures were transformed into compressive loads in non-pressurizer loop SGs as a result of RCS depressur-
ization, which effectively eliminated the potential for SGTR in Cases SUR-08 and SUR-09. Differences 
due to the treatment of upper plenum steel were insignificant. Additional information regarding all initial 
Surry analyses (Cases SUR-01 through SUR-09) is available for further reference in previously issued 
documents.23,24,28
5.2.3.  ANO2 Analyses without RCP Seal Leaks
As indicated in Table 4, ANO2 Case ANO2-01 was similar to Surry Case SUR-01 except that SG sec-
ondary depressurization was simulated in Case ANO2-01. SG secondary depressurization was simulated in 
all ANO2 analyses completed during the course of this evaluation based on the initial Surry results, which 
indicated that a potential for SGTR will not develop if normal SG secondary pressures are maintained. 
Like other TMLB’ accidents, decay heat transfer from the core led to SG secondary dry out and the subse-
quent boiling of primary inventory in Case ANO2-01. Natural circulation of vapor was ultimately estab-
lished, leading to ex-vessel heating as shown in Figure 35. As indicated in the figure and in Table 5, the 
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first failure in the RCS pressure boundary developed when the surge line was heated to the point of creep 
rupture at 11,330 s. The calculation was allowed to proceed without introduction of a break at the time of 
surge line failure in order to conservatively determine the timing associated with other potential RCS pres-
sure boundary failures. Accordingly, failure of both hot legs (at 12,150 and 12,510 s) and a SGTR at 
13,750 s were predicted. (Event timing for this analysis, and all other initial plant analyses, has been sum-
marized in Table 5 for reference.) Those results are similar to previously discussed Surry result in that the 
potential for SGTR is low because surge line failure was predicted 2420 s earlier than tube failure. Conse-
quently, the potential for SGTR was not adversely affected by the Combustion Engineering design of the 
ANO2 plant relative to the Westinghouse design of the Surry PWR in this case.
ANO2 Case ANO2-02 was identical to Case ANO2-01 except that a break was introduced in 
Case ANO2-02 when the first RCS pressure boundary was predicted to fail. Accordingly, a surge line 
break was introduced in Case ANO2-02 at 11,330 s, resulting in rapid depressurization of the RCS and the 
end of pressurizer PORV cycling. Accumulator injection followed, providing water sufficient to reflood 
the active core. The reflood effectively arrested the heatup of the core and cooled the RCS piping as shown 
in Figure 36. Core reheating did occur after the accumulator water was boiled away. However, energy 
associated with core reheating was primarily directed out the surge line break, which prevented any signif-
icant reheating of the RCS piping. A decision was made to terminate Case ANO2-02 at 21,550 s because it 
was clear that additional RCS pressure boundary failures would be very unlikely. Those results are similar 
to results for Surry Case SUR-02. Specifically, SGTR cannot occur if the surge line fails as predicted in 
either ANO2 or Surry for these conditions because the SG tubes are subjected to compression loading as a 
result of RCS depressurization. SG tube collapse is possible, but relatively high temperatures in conjunc-
tion with the compression loads would be required to generate that type of failure. Those results also con-
firm that the potential for SGTR is not adversely affected by design differences between ANO2 and Surry 
PWRs.
5.2.4.  ANO2 Analyses with RCP Seal Leaks
RCP seal leaks were simulated in ANO2 Cases ANO2-03 and ANO2-04. The simulation was based on 
the expected behavior of Byron Jackson RCP seals, which are used in the ANO2 plant.25 Specifically, 
Byron Jackson pump seals are expected to leak 1.5 gpm of subcooled water per RCP at nominal operating 
conditions if seal cooling water is lost and an estimated maximum of 220 gpm per RCP.29 Based on that 
information, a seal leak area equivalent to 1.5 gpm per RCP was introduced in Cases ANO2-03 and 
ANO2-04 at TMLB’ accident initiation since seal cooling water is lost when AC power is lost. The appro-
priate leak area was established for flow of saturated liquid at nominal conditions. Seal leak areas were 
subsequently increased from the equivalent of 1.5 gpm per RCP to the equivalent of 220 gpm per RCP at 
the time saturated conditions were reached at any of the pumps, similar to the approach used in Surry RCP 
seal leak cases. Seal leaks of 220 gpm per RCP were assumed in both cases because the rate was the maxi-
mum that would be expected and because the rate seemed large enough to potentially influence RCP loop 
seal clearing. The appropriate leak area was established for flow of saturated liquid at 16.4 MPa, corre-
sponding with the average of the opening and closing set points of the pressurizer PORVs.
ANO2 Cases ANO2-03 and ANO2-04 differed only with respect to the treatment of upper plenum 
steel if melting of that steel was predicted. In Case ANO2-03, it was assumed that all upper plenum steel 
that was predicted to melt would relocate into the lower head and quench, given an adequate liquid inven-
tory. In Case ANO2-04, it was assumed that molten upper plenum steel would candle through the core and 
refreeze at some relatively cool core location without quenching.
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The first RCS pressure boundary failures in ANO2 Cases ANO2-03 and ANO2-04 were predicted to 
be hot leg failures, instead of the surge line failures that developed in all previous ANO2 cases (see 
Table 5). Hot leg failures, rather than surge line failures, were predicted in Cases ANO2-03 and ANO2-04 
because pressurizer PORV flow and therefore, surge line heating, was reduced as a result of flows through 
RCP seal leaks. Those results are similar to previously discussed results for Surry RCP seal leak analyses. 
However, there were some important differences between ANO2 and Surry results relative to the potential 
for SGTR.
SGTRs did not develop in Surry Cases SUR-08 and SUR-09 because the RCS was depressurized by 
RCP seal leaks. Tube differential pressures were reduced to zero in pressurizer loop SGs and tube differen-
tial pressures were transformed into compressive loads in non-pressurizer loop SGs as a result of RCS 
depressurization, which effectively eliminated the potential for SGTR in those cases. Similar depressuriza-
tion of the RCS was predicted in ANO2 Cases ANO2-03 and ANO2-04 as a result of RCP seal leaks. 
However, quenching of upper plenum stainless steel and the associated pressure pertubations had a rela-
tively large affect on the integrity of RCS piping in the ANO2 analyses. Specifically, the first RCS pres-
sure boundary failure in Case ANO2-03 was predicted to be a hot leg failure at 18,330 s. SGTR was 
predicted in that case at 18,400 s, only 70 s later. That timing difference is insignificant, indicating a poten-
tial for SGTR before any other RCS pressure boundary failure for the Case ANO2-03 conditions that were 
analyzed. In Case ANO2-04, the absence of pressure pertubations associated with stainless steel quenching 
delayed hot leg failure by 3070 s. More importantly, SGTR was not predicted in Case ANO2-04 as indi-
cated in Table 5.
Reasons for differences between ANO2 and Surry relative to stainless steel quenching and the affects 
of the associated pressure pertubations were not investigated. However, one possibility could be that larger 
quantities of steel melt in ANO2 because of upper plenum design differences relative to the Surry PWR. 
Larger quantities of molten steel could be expected to generate larger pressure pertubations, with a larger 
affect on RCS piping integrity. In any case, assuming that upper plenum stainless steel is quenched during 
relocation into the lower head, if melting of that steel is predicted, could be overly conservative with 
respect to the potential for SGTR. That is because the code conservatively assumes that all relocated mate-
rial will be completely cooled to the saturation temperature of the lower head coolant during a single time 
step when the quenching option is activated. Heat rejected from the molten material during that process is 
added directly to the lower head coolant during the same time step. Furthermore, the stainless steel must 
candle through a tortuous path from the upper plenum all the way to the lower head without refreezing if 
quenching is to occur. Results indicate that temperatures near the bottom of the active fuel region (and 
above the lower head) can be cooler than the stainless steel melting temperature, particularly in cases with 
RCS depressurization that activates the accumulators, like Case ANO2-03. In such cases, the stainless steel 
could refreeze before reaching the lower head and thereby eliminate the potential for quenching. If quench-
ing does occur, the results indicate a potential for SGTR in the ANO2 PWR.
It should be noted that all of the foregoing initial plant analyses were originally completed without the 
servo valve modeling refinement (discussed in Section 3.2) and the mixed convection code updates (dis-
cussed in Section 4.2). (Although Surry Cases SUR-03 and SUR-06 were ultimately revised using a ver-
sion of SCDAP/RELAP5 with mixed convection updates as mentioned above.) Omission of the mixed 
convection updates is not expected to be critical because a comparison of results for the ANO2 PWR with 
and without the updates indicated that ex-vessel temperatures were relatively insensitive to the modifica-
tion. Analyses with RCP loop seal clearing could potentially benefit by the use of the servo valve modeling 
refinement, which was developed after the initial plant analyses were complete. RCP loop seal clearing 
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was generally limited to analyses with RCP seal leaks (including two of nine Surry analyses and two of 
four ANO2 analyses). However, analyses with RCP loop seal clearing were not repeated using the model-
ing refinement to determine how results might change. Additional information regarding all initial ANO2 
analyses (Cases ANO2-01 through ANO2-04) is available for further reference in a previously issued doc-
ument.30
5.3. Plant Sensitivity Analyses
Following completion of the initial plant analyses, six sensitivity analyses for the Surry PWR (with 
Case SUR-06A through Case SUR-06F designations) were completed to address (1) uncertainties in heat 
transfer coefficients, (2) the absence of conjugate heat transfer effects in the SCDAP/RELAP5 split hot leg 
model (consisting of the combination of fluid-to-wall heat transfer, fluid-to-fluid heat transfer, and circum-
ferential conduction around the hot leg pipe wall), and (3) the synergistic effects associated with simulta-
neous variations in Westinghouse countercurrent natural circulation parameters. These analyses were 
needed and specifically designed to address comments made by peer reviewers and the ACRS as discussed 
in Section 4.3. A summary description for each of these analyses is provided in Table 4. The table also 
identifies references to supporting documentation, if available.
As indicated by their designations, all plant sensitivity analyses were based on Surry Case SUR-06.a In 
fact, the analyses were extended from the onset of hot leg countercurrent natural circulation as predicted in 
Case SUR-06 (at 9091 s) through the time of SGTR. The period following the onset of countercurrent nat-
ural circulation was the only period of interest because there is no threat to any RCS pressure boundary 
prior to that time. Breaks were not introduced following any predicted pressure boundary failure in any of 
the calculations in order to conservatively evaluate the potential for other failures.
5.3.1.  Sensitivity to Heat Transfer Coefficients
Surry Cases SUR-06A, SUR-06B, SUR-06C, and SUR-06D were designed for evaluation of the 
potential for a natural-circulation induced SGTR in Surry relative to uncertainties in heat transfer coeffi-
cients. In Cases SUR-06A and SUR-06B, heat transfer coefficients that could impact ex-vessel heating 
were altered to reasonably cover the expected range of uncertainty. Specifically, all code-calculated heat 
transfer coefficients in the upper plenum, hot legs, surge line, and on the inner and outer surfaces of the SG 
tubes were increased by 20% in Case SUR-06A and decreased by 20% in Case SUR-06B. Uncertainties in 
heat transfer that could be associated with entrance effects were addressed in Cases SUR-06C and 
SUR-06D. In Case SUR-06C, all code-calculated heat transfer coefficients in the hot leg, surge line, and 
SG tube entrance volumes were increased by 30%. An extreme bias of enhancing only code-calculated 
heat transfer coefficients in SG tube entrance volumes (by 30%) was assumed in Case SUR-06D.
a. Surry Case SUR-06, and Surry Case SUR-03, were originally completed without code updates to treat 
mixed convection heat transfer.23 Both analyses were ultimately revised using a version of the code with 
mixed convection updates.24 The code was modified to treat mixed convection based on peer reviewer rec-
ommendations (see Section 4.2) and the modified code was used in all analyses performed after the recom-
mendations were made. Revisions of Cases SUR-06, and SUR-03, were completed so that comparisons with 
subsequent analyses could be made without concern that observed differences were related to the updates. 
All results presented here were taken from the revised analyses.
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As heat transfer coefficients were increased, the temperature of the vapor entering the SGs decreased 
as shown in Figure 37. Vapor temperatures decreased because more energy was transferred from vapor to 
structures as heat transfer coefficients increased. As the temperature of the vapor entering the SGs 
decreased, SG tube temperatures decreased. Lower SG tube temperatures led to delays in predicted 
SGTRs. Those trends are reflected in the results listed in Table 8. Specifically, the lowest SG tube temper-
ature (at the time of surge line failure) was predicted in Case SUR-06A, which was the transient simulating 
the largest increase in heat transfer. In addition, the timing difference between surge line failure and SG 
tube failure was larger in Case SUR-06A than in any other heat transfer coefficient sensitivity calculation. 
(It is worth noting that the observed vapor temperature differences were relatively small. For that reason, 
results presented in Figure 37 were limited to only those cases simulating the smallest and largest increases 
in heat transfer.)
The timing of all ex-vessel failures for Cases SUR-06A through SUR-06D (and all other plant sensitiv-
ity analyses considered) are summarized in Table 9 for reference. It is important to note that surge line fail-
ure was predicted before SGTR in all analyses. The results also indicate that pressurizer loop SG tube 
temperatures and differential pressures are consistently more severe than non-pressurizer loop SG tube 
temperatures and differential pressures. That difference, which is a result of the assumed failure of the 
pressurizer loop SG RV, minimizes the concern for a non-pressurizer loop SGTR relative to other potential 
RCS pressure boundary failures.
Results from Cases SUR-06A, SUR-06B, SUR-06C, and SUR-06D indicate that the timing of SGTR 
could vary by 130 s over the range of heat transfer coefficient uncertainty that was considered. Further-
more, SG tube temperatures at the time of surge line failure could vary from 938 to 964 K, a range of only 
26 K. Those results would not be expected to significantly alter the potential for SGTR, indicating that heat 
transfer coefficient uncertainties are not important factors in this evaluation.
5.3.2.  Hot Leg Conjugate Heat Transfer Sensitivity
The absence of fluid-to-fluid heat transfer and circumferential pipe wall conduction in the 
SCDAP/RELAP5 split hot leg model was addressed in Surry Case SUR-06E. Radiation was assumed to be 
the primary mechanism for fluid-to-fluid heat transfer since mixing of hot leg countercurrent flow streams 
was not experimentally observed. Radiation between the hot flow in the top half of the hot leg and the 
cooler return flow in the bottom half of the hot leg was simulated by placing a very thin heat structure 
(0.024 m) with a high thermal conductivity (6.23e9 W/m-K) and a low heat capacity (6.71e5 J/m3-K)
between the flow streams in each volume of each hot leg. The inside diameter of the hot leg and the length 
of each volume were used to establish structure heat transfer surface areas. A high convective heat transfer 
coefficient (2.04e6 W/m2-K) was applied to the side of each structure in contact with the hot flow at each 
time step, which effectively held each structure at the temperature of the associated hot flow stream. A 
temperature dependent convective heat transfer coefficient equivalent to the black body radiation potential 
was then calculated for each structure at each time step and applied to the side of the structure in contact 
with the cooler flow stream. Calculated values ranged from 0 to 245.3 W/m2-K.
Circumferential pipe wall conduction was simulated in Surry Case SUR-06E by calculating the heat 
that could be conducted between top and bottom halves of each section of each split hot leg pipe during 
each time step. The calculations were based on the volume-averaged temperatures of the pipe halves as 
reported by SCDAP/RELAP5. Specifically, the difference between the volume-averaged temperatures was 
used as the conduction driving potential and the “average” volume-averaged temperature was used to 
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determine the thermal conductivity of the stainless steel pipe wall. A conduction path length equal to a 
quarter of the wall centerline circumference was used since the volume-averaged temperatures were 
assumed to approximate wall temperatures half way between the top/bottom of the pipe and the intersec-
tion of the two pipe halves. Heat transfer surface areas were twice the product of the wall thickness and 
length of each pipe section, given that conduction will develop symmetrically on both sides of the split hot 
leg pipe. The calculated conduction of heat for each section of each split hot leg was then added to the bot-
tom half and subtracted from the top half of the pipe during each time step.
The hot leg vapor 'T (the difference between the temperature of the hot vapor in the top half of the hot 
leg and the temperature of the cooler vapor in the bottom half of the hot leg) in Case SUR-06E was 
reduced relative to Case SUR-06 as a result of fluid-to-fluid heat transfer and circumferential pipe wall 
conduction as indicated in Figure 38. The reduction in hot leg vapor 'T led to a reduction in hot leg coun-
tercurrent flow and an associated reduction in the heat transferred to primary coolant loop structures. With 
less energy transferred to loop structures, more energy was stored in core and more energy was rejected 
through PORV cycling. Consequently, creep rupture failure of the pressurizer surge line in Case SUR-06E
was predicted 150 s earlier than in Case SUR-06.
Vapor temperatures entering the SG tubes in Surry Case SUR-06E were also reduced as a result of the 
conjugate heat transfer effects in the split hot leg model. The reduced vapor temperatures entering the SG 
tubes resulted in lower SG tube temperatures, which delayed SGTR in Case SUR-06E relative to 
Case SUR-06. Specifically, the results indicate that the addition of fluid-to-fluid heat transfer and circum-
ferential pipe wall conduction could delay SG tube failure by 280 s. Furthermore, SG tube temperatures at 
the time of surge line failure were 20 K cooler in Case SUR-06E than in Case SUR-06. Those results indi-
cate that conjugate heat transfer effects in the hot leg would tend to decrease the potential for SGTR.
5.3.3.  Synergistic Effects Associated with Natural Circulation Parameters
Potential synergistic effects associated with simultaneous variations in Westinghouse natural circula-
tion parameters (i.e., mixing fractions, recirculation ratios, and the fraction of SG tubes that participate in 
hot [forward] flow during countercurrent natural circulation) were addressed in Surry Case SUR-06F. Spe-
cifically, Case SUR-06F was completed using 5% confidence values for the natural circulation parameters, 
which were calculated assuming a normal distribution of the Westinghouse high pressure transient data 
and conservatively assuming that the parameters are independent of each other (resulting in mixing frac-
tions of 0.73, a recirculation ratio of 1.8, and 43% of the SG tubes participating in hot [forward] flow). 
Note that the calculated 5% confidence values, which correspond to parameter values that should be 
smaller than 95% of all values, are believed to conservatively represent the tail of the assumed distribution 
because each parameter was calculated independently without any allowance for relationships with the 
other parameters and all values were lower than any actually observed during the transient experiments.
Results indicate that SG tube temperatures at the time of surge line failure in Case SUR-06F were 
~50 K higher than in Case SUR-06. Those results are consistent with the stand alone loop sensitivity anal-
yses where SG tube temperatures were found to increase when mixing fractions are decreased, recircula-
tion is increased, or the fraction of SG tubes participating in hot (forward) flow is decreased. Two of three 
parameter differences between Cases SUR-06F and SUR-06 support the prediction of higher temperatures 
in Case SUR-06F. Furthermore, the predicted temperature increase (relative to temperature differences 
observed in the stand alone loop analyses) indicates that simultaneous variations in natural circulation 
parameters do not disproportionately impact SG tube heating.
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Results listed in Table 9 also indicate that the synergistic effects associated with simultaneous varia-
tions in natural circulation parameters could accelerate SGTR by 430 s relative to the timing of SGTR in 
Surry Case SUR-06. It is important to note, however, that use of the calculated 5% confidence values 
(which correspond to parameter values that should be smaller than 95% of all values) is believed to conser-
vatively represent the tail of the assumed distribution because each value was calculated independently 
without any allowance for relationships with the other parameters and all values were lower than any actu-
ally observed during the transient experiments. Nevertheless, surge line failure in Case SUR-06F was still 
predicted some 800 s prior to SGTR. Given that prediction of surge line failure, the potential for SGTR rel-
ative to simultaneous variations in natural circulation parameters is still low.
It should be noted that all of the plant sensitivity analyses described above were completed with 
SCDAP/RELAP5 mixed convection updates, but without the servo valve modeling refinement. Absence of 
the servo valve refinement did not appear to be critical because the potential for full-loop circulation was 
expected to be low and the duration of full-loop circulation, if it developed at all, was not expected to be 
prolonged. Additional information regarding Case SUR-06F and all other plant sensitivity analyses is 
available for reference in a previously issued document.24
5.4. Plant RCS Depressurization Analyses
Results from the initial plant analyses that were completed during the earliest phase of this evaluation 
indicated that a potential for failure of (defect-free) SG tubes does not exist during TMLB’ accidents with-
out SG secondary depressurization (see Section 5.2). That is because SG tube heating is not severe enough 
to produce SGTR when tube differential pressures are limited by maintenance of secondary pressures. 
Consequently, all subsequent analyses focused on variations of TMLB’ accidents with SG secondary 
depressurization in order to determine how other conditions could affect the SGTR potential. After a com-
prehensive set of analyses with SG secondary depressurization were completed (see Section 5.3), RCS 
depressurization was proposed as an approach that might be used to reduce any SGTR potential by mini-
mizing the tube differential pressure.
The RCS of a PWR can be depressurized if there is a leak in the pressure boundary (i.e., through RCP 
seals, through pressure boundary failures that initiate an accident, through pressure boundary failures that 
develop as a result of accident-related natural circulation heating), if the pressurizer PORVs fail open (or 
partially open), or if plant operators intentionally open the pressurizer PORVs. In this evaluation, it was 
assumed that operators would open pressurizer PORVs in all RCS depressurization analyses. Although 
“intentional” RCS depressurization through the PORVs will reduce the tube differential pressure, this part 
of the evaluation was needed to determine if RCS depressurization will lead to RCP loop seal clearing. If 
RCP loop seals clear, full-loop natural circulation could be established, which could increase SG tube tem-
peratures and the potential for SGTR, in spite of any differential pressure reduction.
It was assumed that operators would open pressurizer PORVs in all SCDAP/RELAP5 RCS depressur-
ization analyses completed during this evaluation when the core exit temperature reached 922 K. An exit 
temperature of 922 K indicates that the core is in the process of uncovering and that core damage is immi-
nent. Opening pressurizer PORVs at that temperature is also consistent with the recommendations of an 
earlier study of intentional RCS depressurization.31
Analyses for operating PWRs with pressurizer PORVs (represented by the Surry, Zion, Calvert Cliffs, 
and Oconee plants) were completed to cover intentional RCS depressurization, intentional RCS depressur-
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ization with RCP seal leaks, and intentional RCS depressurization where bypass flow paths from the 
downcomer to the hot leg were blocked. In addition, analyses for operating PWRs with U-tube SGs (repre-
sented by the Surry, Zion, and Calvert Cliffs plants) were completed to cover intentional RCS depressur-
ization with the accumulation of sludge on top of SG tube sheets. (Sludge accumulation in PWRs with 
once-through SGs was not considered.) As indicated in Table 4, all RCS depressurization analyses were 
completed using the servo valve modeling refinement and SCDAP/RELAP5 mixed convection updates. 
Details associated with all RCS depressurization analyses are outlined below.
5.4.1.  RCS Depressurization
As indicated in Table 4, analyses designed to address the potential for SGTR in operating PWRs dur-
ing TMLB’ accidents with intentional RCS depressurization include Surry Case SUR-20, Zion Case ZI-01,
Calvert Cliffs Case CC-01, and Oconee Case OC-01. Those analyses were also completed to provide a 
basis for the SGTR potential relative to all other RCS depressurization analyses.
SCDAP/RELAP5 results indicate that RCP loop seal clearing will occur in PWRs with U-tube SGs 
when the RCS is depressurized through pressurizer PORVs. Furthermore, SG tube temperatures will sig-
nificantly increase as a result of full-loop natural circulation heating following RCP loop seal clearing. The 
SG tube temperature increase associated with full-loop circulation shown for Zion Case ZI-01 in Figure 39
is typical. However, SGTR was not predicted for any operating PWR with U-tube SGs and intentional 
RCS depressurization as indicated in Table 10. SGTR did not occur because SG tube heating was not high 
enough to result in failure in the absence of any tube differential pressure.
RCP loop seal clearing was not predicted for the Oconee PWR with once-through SGs. Consequently, 
all SG tube temperatures remained relatively cool because full-loop natural circulation did not develop and 
once-through SGs tubes do not participate in countercurrent circulation. Basic geometric configurations of 
the Oconee PWR (i.e., the size, shape, and the relative elevations) appeared to be the most important fac-
tors in the retention of RCP loop liquids.
Results listed in Table 10 indicate that the first RCS pressure boundary failure in operating PWRs with 
intentional RCS depressurization will occur in the surge line. Hot leg failures were also predicted in all 
analyses, given that breaks were not introduced following predicted surge line failures. The results also 
indicate that pressurizer loop SG tube temperatures and differential pressures are consistently more severe 
than non-pressurizer loop SG tube temperatures and differential pressures because of the assumed PORV 
failure in the pressurizer loop SG. However, SGTR was not predicted in any calculation, indicating that the 
potential for SGTR is low when the RCS is depressurized through pressurizer PORVs. Additional informa-
tion regarding analyses with intentional RCS depressurization is available for reference in a previously 
issued document.32
5.4.2.  RCS Depressurization with RCP Seal Leaks
Intentional depressurization of the RCS through pressurizer PORVs was augmented by depressuriza-
tion associated with RCP seal leaks in a second series of analyses for the Surry, Zion, Calvert Cliffs, and 
Oconee plants. RCP seal leak rates that were considered for those PWRs are discussed below.
Surry and Zion plants, like all other Westinghouse PWRs, use Westinghouse RCPs.25 Westinghouse 
pump seals are expected to leak 21 gpm of subcooled water per RCP at nominal operating conditions if 
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seal cooling water is lost.26 Since seal cooling water is lost when AC power is lost, a seal leak area equiva-
lent to 21 gpm per RCP was introduced in all Surry and Zion analyses with RCP leaks at TMLB’ accident 
initiation. Subsequent seal degradation and failure is expected as a TMLB’ accident progresses because the 
seals are not designed for exposure to high temperature steam. The seals are particularly vulnerable to fail-
ure when fluid in the RCP reaches a saturated condition because seal faces tend to pop open as a result of 
two-phase flow instabilities. Although a specific leak rate is difficult to predict given possible variations in 
seal failure, a panel of experts concluded that 250 gpm per RCP is the most likely leak rate from Westing-
house pumps during a TMLB’ accident.27 Based on that information, a decision was made to evaluate seal 
leaks of 125 and 250 gpm per RCP. That approach encompassed best-estimate leakage and a plausible 
intermediate value. Areas for both leak rates were established assuming flow of saturated liquid at 
16.0 MPa, corresponding with the average of the opening and closing set points of the pressurizer PORVs. 
Consistent with the foregoing, the seal leak areas were appropriately increased from the equivalent of 
21 gpm per RCP to the equivalent of either 125 or 250 gpm per RCP at the time saturated conditions were 
reached at any of the pumps. As indicated in Table 4, leaks that increase to 125 and 250 gpm per RCP were 
evaluated in Surry Cases SUR-21 and SUR-22, respectively, and in Zion Cases ZI-02 and ZI-03, respec-
tively.a
The Calvert Cliffs plant, like all Combustion Engineering PWRs other than the Palo Verde plants, uses 
Byron Jackson RCPs.25 (Klein, Schanzlin, & Becker RCPs are used in Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3.25) Byron 
Jackson pump seals are expected to leak 1.5 gpm of subcooled water per RCP at nominal operating condi-
tions if seal cooling water is lost and an estimated maximum of 220 gpm per RCP.29 Based on that infor-
mation, a decision was made to evaluate seal leaks of 110 and 220 gpm per RCP. That approach 
encompassed the maximum leakage and a plausible intermediate value. Areas for both leak rates were 
established assuming flow of saturated liquid at 16.4 MPa, corresponding with the average of the opening 
and closing set points of the pressurizer PORVs. Since seal cooling water is lost when AC power is lost, a 
seal leak area equivalent to 1.5 gpm per RCP was introduced in all Calvert Cliffs analyses with RCP seal 
leaks at TMLB’ accident initiation. Like the treatment for Surry and Zion, seal leak areas were then appro-
priately increased from the equivalent of 1.5 gpm per RCP to the equivalent of either 110 or 220 gpm per 
RCP at the time saturated conditions were reached at any of the pumps. As indicated in Table 4, leaks that 
increase to 110 and 220 gpm per RCP were evaluated in Calvert Cliffs Cases CC-02 and CC-03, respec-
tively. (Because information was not available, potential seal leaks from Klein, Schanzlin, & Becker RCPs 
were not specifically considered.)
Three different RCPs are used in Babcock and Wilcox PWRs including Westinghouse RCPs in 
Oconee 1 and Three Mile Island 1; Byron Jackson RCPs in Arkansas Nuclear One 1, Crystal River 3, and 
Davis Besse; and Bingham International RCPs in Oconee 2 and 3.25 Information on Bingham International 
a. It should be noted that the need for a modeling improvement in the Zion surge line/hot leg nodalization 
was identified after Zion Cases ZI-02 and ZI-03 were underway. The need for an improvement became 
apparent because the surge line was not heating as quickly as expected. It was determined that surge line 
heatup was delayed because flows into the surge line from the bottom and top halves of the split hot leg were 
not balanced. The flow imbalance indicated that the flow resistance from the bottom half of the split hot leg 
to the surge line was not equal to the flow resistance from the top half of the split hot leg to the surge line. 
After some assessment, it was determined that the flow balance could be improved by moving Valve 156 
from the lower half of the split hot leg to the surge line outlet as indicated in Figure 40. Results from scoping 
calculations performed with that modeling change indicated improvement in the flow balance. Accordingly, 
Cases ZI-02 and ZI-03, as well as all other remaining Zion analyses, were completed using the improved 
nodalization.
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RCP leakage was not available. Without that information, a decision was made to evaluate the potential for 
SGTR in the Oconee plant using Westinghouse RCP leaks of 125 and 250 gpm per RCP as discussed 
above for Surry and Zion. That approach was taken because the Westinghouse leaks encompass the Byron 
Jackson leaks. As indicated in Table 4, leaks that increase from 21 gpm per RCP to 125 and 250 gpm per 
RCP were evaluated in Oconee Cases OC-02 and OC-03, respectively.
Results in RCS depressurization analyses with and without RCP seal leaks were quite similar. Most 
notably, surge line failure was always predicted before any other RCS pressure boundary failure and 
SGTR did not develop in any calculation as indicated in Tables 10 and 11. The most significant differences 
that were observed were related to RCP loop seal clearing. Specifically, loop seals cleared in all analyses 
with RCP seal leaks while loop seal clearing was limited to PWRs with U-tube SGs in analyses without 
RCP seal leaks. Boiling as steam passed from the SGs to the RCP seal leaks was apparently needed in 
order to clear RCP loop seals in PWRs with once-through SGs. Although tube temperatures increased in 
all analyses as a result of RCP loop seal clearing and the associated development of full-loop natural circu-
lation, SGTR did not occur because heating was not severe enough to cause failure in the absence of tube 
differential pressure. Consequently, the potential for SGTR is low when RCS depressurization is aug-
mented with depressurization through RCP seal leaks. Additional information regarding analyses with 
intentional RCS depressurization and RCP seal leaks is available for reference in a previously issued docu-
ment.33
5.4.3.  RCS Depressurization without Downcomer-Hot Leg Bypass Flows
As indicated in Table 4, analyses designed to address the effects of downcomer-hot leg (DC-HL) 
bypass flows with respect to the potential for SGTR during TMLB’ accidents with intentional RCS depres-
surization include Surry Case SUR-23, Zion Case ZI-04, Calvert Cliffs Case CC-04, and Oconee 
Case OC-04. DC-HL bypass flows are associated with small gaps between hot leg nozzles (which are 
welded to the reactor vessel) and hot leg piping inside the vessel (which is welded to the core barrel). 
Those gaps are designed to facilitate installation and removal of vessel internals. During normal operation, 
RCPs drive cold leg flows into the downcomer at pressures greater than pressures in the hot legs. Conse-
quently, some of the downcomer flow can bypass the core by flowing through the gaps directly into the hot 
legs as shown in Figure 41. (DC-HL bypass flows are normally no more than about 1% of total primary 
flow.) In this evaluation, it was conservatively assumed that all DC-HL bypass flows were reduced to zero 
by thermal expansion at the time superheated vapor reaches the core exit in each of the specified analyses. 
Pertinent results were then compared to results from analyses with unaltered DC-HL bypass flows. That 
comparison was used to determine the effects of DC-HL bypass flows on natural circulation heating of the 
SG tubes and the potential for SGTR.
Thermal expansion may reduce DC-HL bypass flows because the core and core barrel could heat up 
and expand faster than the more massive reactor vessel wall. Reducing all DC-HL bypass flows to zero at 
the time superheated vapor reaches the core exit provides a uniform criteria for eliminating DC-HL bypass 
flows and is conservative relative to the potential impact in two respects. First, that approach neglects the 
possibility for non-symmetric heating. And second, thermal expansion at the time superheated vapor 
reaches the core exit would probably not be sufficient to completely close the hot leg gaps. Consequently, 
the effects of DC-HL bypass flows on natural circulation heating of the SG tubes and the potential for 
SGTR that may develop in operating PWRs should not exceed the effects described here. Specific flows 
that were eliminated include the Surry DC-HL bypass (connecting Volume 102 to Volume 172 in 
Figure 3), the Zion DC-HL bypass (connecting Volume 502 to Volume 582 in Figure 7), the Calvert Cliffs 
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DC-HL bypass (connecting Volume 502 to Volume 535 in Figure 10), and the Oconee DC-HL bypass 
(connecting Volume 565 to Volume 545 in Figure 16).
SCDAP/RELAP5 results indicate that accumulators will empty quicker and RCP loop seals will clear 
more readily when DC-HL bypass flow paths are blocked. Accumulators emptied quicker because down-
comer pressurization during the steam production phase of accumulator injection was slower without 
DC-HL bypass flows. Consequently, downcomer (and cold leg) pressures remained below accumulator 
pressures for longer periods of time, allowing accumulators to empty quicker. Temperatures were cooler 
overall as a result, which tended to delay RCS pressure boundary failures as indicated in Table 12.
During the initial phase of accumulator injection, cold leg condensation can reduce pressures down-
stream of the RCP loop seal, which can “pull” water out of the loop seal. In-core boiling near the end of a 
given injection can increase pressures upstream of the RCP loop seal, which can “push” water out of the 
loop seal. When DC-HL bypass flow paths are blocked, there is a greater tendency to both “pull” and 
“push” water out of the RCP loop seals, allowing loop seals to clear more readily. That tendency was not 
as important for the Oconee PWR because Oconee is the only plant in this evaluation with upper head vent 
valves. Those valves are large compared to the DC-HL bypass and they can effectively equalize upper ple-
num pressures with pressures in the downcomer in the absence of DC-HL bypass flows.
Other important results with and without DC-HL bypass flows were similar despite differences in 
accumulator response and RCP loop seal behavior. Notably, surge line failure was predicted before any 
other RCS pressure boundary failure with one exceptiona, and SGTR did not develop in any calculation as 
indicated in Table 12. On that basis, it appears that the DC-HL bypass does not adversely impact the poten-
tial for SGTR. Additional information regarding the DC-HL bypass evaluation is available for reference in 
a previously issued document.34
5.4.4.  RCS Depressurization with SG Sludge Accumulation
Sludge can collect on top of tube sheets on the secondary sides of U-tube SGs. The impact of accumu-
lated sludge on the potential for SGTR in operating PWRs with U-tube SGs was addressed in the final 
series of RCS depressurization analyses. (Sludge accumulation in once-through SGs was not considered.) 
The sludge, which primarily consists of a mixture of copper and iron particles, was assumed to be 12 in.
deep in all affected analyses. The potential for SGTR could be impacted because relatively high tube tem-
peratures could develop in regions adjacent to the sludge where heat transfer to secondary fluids could be 
reduced.
The conventional SCDAP/RELAP5 SG nodalization provides only one heat structure representing 
several feet of tube above the tube sheet as shown in Figure 42(a). Convective boundary conditions for that 
tube heat structure were defined by single hydrodynamic volumes on either side; one representing RCS 
fluid and one representing secondary fluid. Direct simulation of tube wall temperatures adjacent to any 
accumulated sludge is not possible with that nodalization. Refined SG nodalization for operating PWRs 
a. The pressure boundary failure exception occurred in Calvert Cliffs Case CC-04, where the hot leg was 
predicted to fail before the surge line. Although it was not verified, the delay in surge line failure is believed 
to be an artifact of the surge line/hot leg nodalization. An earlier surge line failure would be expected if the 
nodalization was modified to balance flows into the surge line from top and bottom halves of the split hot leg 
as discussed in Section 5.5.
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with U-tube SGs (represented by the Surry, Zion, and Calvert Cliffs plants) was therefore necessary as out-
lined below.
Refined SG nodalization included the addition of a 12 in. sludge layer and division of the single RCS 
hydraulic volume to provide separate RCS volumes adjacent to the tube sheet, the sludge, and the remain-
ing section of the SG tubes as shown in Figure 42(b). The refined nodalization was applied to inlet and out-
let sides of both hot and cold tube bundles in all SGs in each of the representative plants. Specifically, the 
conventional Surry nodalization for the coolant loop containing the pressurizer is shown in Figure 5. SG 
hydrodynamic volumes 408-01, 408-08, 409-01, and 409-08 are analogous to the single RCS volume 
shown in Figure 42(a). Each of those Surry hydrodynamic volumes were divided into three smaller vol-
umes consistent with the refined nodalization shown in Figure 42(b). Thus, eight volumes were added to 
each Surry SG. Similarly, the conventional Zion nodalization for the pressurizer loop is shown in Figure 9.
Hydrodynamic volumes 110-01, 110-08, 111-01, and 111-08 are analogous to the single RCS volume 
shown in Figure 42(a). Each of the hydrodynamic volumes were divided into three smaller volumes con-
sistent with the refined nodalization shown in Figure 42(b), adding eight volumes to each Zion SG. And 
finally, the conventional Calvert Cliffs nodalization is shown in Figure 12. Pressurizer loop volumes 
125-01, 125-09, 126-01, and 126-09 and non-pressurizer loop volumes 225-01, 225-09, 226-01, and 
226-09 are analogous to those shown in Figure 42(a). Each of those volumes were divided into three 
smaller volumes consistent with the nodalization shown in Figure 42(b).
The refined SG nodalization shown in Figure 42(b) was introduced into Surry, Zion, and Calvert Cliffs 
models when core exit temperatures reached superheated conditions. (Prior to that time, the presence or 
absence of sludge was not important because SG tube heating was insignificant.) The corresponding anal-
yses, designated Surry Case SUR-25, Zion Case ZI-06, and Calvert Cliffs Case CC-06 as indicated in 
Table 4, were then extended with the assumed sludge accumulation. Separate analyses, designated Surry 
Case SUR-24, Zion Case ZI-05, and Calvert Cliffs Case CC-05, were also completed without sludge using 
the refined nodalization shown in Figure 42(c). A comparison of results was then possible to determine the 
effects of sludge on natural circulation heating of the SG tubes and the potential for SGTR in operating 
PWRs.
Thermal properties of the sludge had to be estimated for use in this evaluation. The estimates were 
based on samples of sludge that have been collected and analyzed for several different nuclear power 
plants.35,36 In all plants, the sludge was found to consist primarily of particles of copper and iron with trace 
amounts of several other elements. It was assumed that the sludge analysis for Indian Point III was ade-
quate for representing sludge in this evaluation. The corresponding constituents that account for more than 
one percent, by weight, of the Indian Point III sample are listed in Table 13. That composition was used to 
estimate sludge thermal properties as outlined below.
Sludge thermal conductivity was calculated assuming that heat transfer occurred through each of the 
constituents in parallel. Resistance to heat conduction due to imperfect contact between particles was 
neglected. Density as a function of temperature was not readily available, so room temperature densities 
were used.37 (Those densities and the mass fraction data indicate a void fraction of 83 percent, which dif-
fers from the reported value of 71 percent.35 This is a relatively small discrepancy considering that open 
literature,38,39 rather than test data, was used to determine the sludge density. It does, however, indicate 
some level of uncertainty in the estimated thermal properties of the sludge.) Heat capacity of the sludge 
was assumed to be the mass-weighted average heat capacity of each of the constituents. Sludge samples 
were collected and analyzed wet. That is, reported mass fractions reflected the presence of water in the 
sludge. Since the SGs are expected to be dry during the entire period of interest in the current evaluation, 
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the volume occupied by water was replaced with an equivalent volume of steam and the thermal properties 
of steam were used when estimating the properties of the sludge. It should be noted that copper, a major 
constituent of the sludge, melts at the relatively low temperature of 1356 K. The potential for that phase 
change was neglected. It was assumed that sufficient heat transfer capability was available from the sludge 
to the tube sheet and the secondary steam that the copper would remain solid throughout most of the sludge 
(although heat transfer from the sludge to the tube sheet and secondary steam were not actually modeled 
with SCDAP/RELAP5.) Therefore, for sludge temperatures above 1356 K, the thermal properties of cop-
per were assumed to be those for solid copper at 1356 K. The estimated sludge properties based on the 
foregoing and used in the SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses are listed in Table 14.
SG tube temperatures in the region just above the tube sheet were hotter with sludge than without. 
Temperatures with and without accumulated sludge as shown for the Surry PWR in Figure 43 are typical. 
Higher temperatures occur because sludge retards heat transfer from the SG tube wall. Higher SG tube 
temperatures led to predictions of SGTRs in both Surry and Zion PWRs. SGTR was not predicted in the 
Calvert Cliffs calculation, although creep damage with sludge was found to be significantly higher than 
damage without sludge as indicated in Figure 44. Those results differ from results associated with all other 
RCS depressurization analyses that were considered in that SGTR was predicted only in cases with sludge. 
However, the results are also similar to results from all other RCS depressurization analyses in that surge 
line failure was predicted before any other failure as indicated in Table 15. The table also indicates that the 
minimum margin between the time of surge line failure and the time of SGTR is ~1 h. Given that margin, 
the potential for SGTR in PWRs with U-tube SGs as a result of sludge accumulation is low. Additional 
information regarding analyses with intentional RCS depressurization and SG sludge accumulation is 
available for reference in a previously issued document.40
5.5.  Plant Nodalization Sensitivity Analyses
Nodalization sensitivity analyses were needed in the latter stages of this evaluation to address two 
issues that were identified through a review of results associated with the plant analyses described in 
Sections 5.2 through 5.4. The first issue arose because relatively large RCS pressure spikes were typically 
predicted following initial accumulator injections and there was a concern that the magnitude of those 
spikes could be related to reactor core axial nodalizations. A reasonable prediction of those pressure spikes 
is of interest because the integrity of RCS pressure boundaries could be affected. The second issue arose 
because there was an unexpected disparity in the predicted timing of surge line failures in the Calvert Cliffs 
PWR. There was a concern that the disparity was a function of the nodalization used to connect the surge 
line to the hot leg. (All of the following sensitivity analyses were completed with the servo valve modeling 
refinement and SCDAP/RELAP5 mixed convection updates as outlined in Table 4.)
5.5.1.  Core Axial Nodalization Sensitivity
With respect to the core axial nodalization issue, some RCS pressure increase is expected as a result of 
boiling when cold accumulator water is injected into a hot reactor core. Simulation of that process using 
SCDAP/RELAP5, however, is affected by the fact that the code does not provide a core temperature con-
tinuum. Instead, average temperatures are calculated to represent each discrete region, or node, in the core. 
(Nodal averages are also calculated for all other thermal and thermal-hydraulic conditions.) In this evalua-
tion, each PWR core was normally divided into 5 radial rings with 10 axial elevations, yielding a total of 
50 core nodes per plant (see Figures 3, 7, 10, 13, and 16).
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When the RCS pressure drops below accumulator pressure, accumulator injection begins and liquid 
levels start to rise into hot regions of the core. Injection continues until the RCS pressure increases above 
accumulator pressure as a result of boiling (or until accumulator inventory is depleted). Since boiling and 
any associated pressure increase calculated by the code is dependent on nodal temperatures, it would 
appear that refined core nodalization could improve temperature predictions, which could lead to refined 
pressure predictions. A Calvert Cliffs calculation, designated Case CC-02CN, was completed to evaluate 
that possibility. As indicated in Table 4, Calvert Cliffs Case CC-02CN was identical to Case CC-02 with 
the exception of core axial nodalization. Specifically, the 10 axial node configuration used in Case CC-02
was replaced with a 20 axial node configuration in Case CC-02CN as shown in Figure 45. (Current 
SCDAP dimension statements limit the number of core axial nodes to 20.) The refinement in nodalization 
focused on the region originally defined by axial nodes 2 through 7 as illustrated. That approach was taken 
because Case CC-02 results indicated that the bulk of in-core boiling occurred in that region. A compari-
son of results from the two analyses was expected to provide some indication of how pressure spikes might 
be affected by core nodalization.
RCS pressures in the Calvert Cliffs PWR using core models with 10 and 20 axial nodes are shown in 
Figure 46. As indicated, the pressures were quite similar until the first accumulator injections occurred 
(just after 11,500 s). At that time, large pressure spikes were predicted in both analyses. However, accumu-
lator injection started somewhat earlier, the peak pressure that was reached was somewhat lower, and the 
duration of spike was somewhat longer in Case CC-02CN (with 20 axial nodes) than in Case CC-02 (with 
10 axial nodes).
Accumulator injection started earlier in Calvert Cliffs Case CC-02CN as shown in Figure 47 because 
the RCS pressure dropped to the initial accumulator pressure relatively quickly. The drop to the initial 
accumulator pressure was relatively quick because vapor discharged through the pressurizer PORV in 
Case CC-02CN was hotter than vapor discharged in Case CC-02 as indicated in Figure 48. The depressur-
ization rate is a function of the energy dissipated through the PORV, which is a function of the vapor tem-
perature. Vapor temperatures in Case CC-02CN were hotter than those in Case CC-02 because oxidation 
began earlier as shown in Figure 49. Oxidation began earlier in Case CC-02CN because the core axial 
power profile was refined when the core nodalization was refined. The peak to average power density in 
Case CC-02CN was almost 2% higher than in Case CC-02 as a result of the refinement. Early oxidation in 
Case CC-02CN was apparently driven by that power difference.
The peak pressure that was reached was somewhat lower and the volume of injected accumulator 
water was larger in Calvert Cliffs Case CC-02CN than in Case CC-02 because PORV vapor temperatures, 
and the corresponding rates of energy dissipation, were higher in Case CC-02CN. The duration of the 
Case CC-02CN pressure spike was relatively long because more water was injected in Case CC-02CN.
With more water in the core, depressurization of the RCS in Case CC-02CN was extended by the time 
required to boil the additional water and vent the additional vapor.
The foregoing results indicate that refined core axial nodalization, as tested, had a relatively minor 
impact on RCS pressure spikes associated with the initial accumulator injection. When the core axial 
nodalization was increased, a somewhat lower peak pressure was reached and some extension of the pres-
sure spike was predicted. However, those pressure differences are relatively minor and they would not be 
expected to significantly alter creep damage of any RCS pressure boundary. Furthermore, the effects that 
were observed were primarily due to refinement in the core axial power profile that was adopted for con-
sistency with the refined core nodalization. Any effects associated with the refined power profile could 
have been minimized by retaining a constant (flat) power density for all subdivisions of a given node. 
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Although that would produce a stepped approximation of the power profile, a better evaluation of the sep-
arate effects of axial nodalization might have been achieved. It is believed that differences in RCS pressure 
spikes, however, would be bounded by the foregoing results if such analyses were completed.
5.5.2.  Surge Line/Hot Leg Nodalization Sensitivity
As previously indicated, analyses were also needed to evaluate an unexpected disparity in the pre-
dicted timing of surge line failures in the Calvert Cliffs PWR relative to the surge line/hot leg nodalization. 
Specifically, Calvert Cliffs Cases CC-01 and CC-05 differed only with respect to SG nodalization and 
surge line/hot leg nodalization as indicated in Table 4. The timing of surge line failure should not have 
been affected by either difference. However, surge line failures in Cases CC-01 and CC-05 were predicted 
at 22,000 and 16,230 s, respectively (see Section 5.4). That unexpected disparity required further evalua-
tion of the differences between the analyses.
The difference in SG nodalization introduced in Calvert Cliffs Case CC-05 was needed so that results 
without sludge accumulation could be directly compared to Case CC-06 results with sludge accumulation 
as discussed in Section 5.4. The new nodalization basically involved splitting SG inlet and outlet volumes 
to provide a dedicated region for the potential accumulation of sludge on top of the tube sheet (see 
Figure 42). Splitting SG volumes for that purpose should not affect the surge line heatup in any way. Scop-
ing calculations verified that the timing of surge line failure was unaffected by that change in SG nodaliza-
tion.
The difference in surge line/hot leg nodalization was introduced in Calvert Cliffs Case CC-05 only to 
maintain consistency among plant models. As discussed in Section 5.4, an improvement was needed in 
modeling the hot leg to surge line connection for the Zion PWR. The improvement involved moving 
Valve 156 from the lower half of the split hot leg to the surge line outlet as indicated in Figure 40. That 
change was necessary so that the appropriate flow balance into the surge line could be obtained with appli-
cation of the abrupt area change option specified in the figure. A flow balance problem did not appear to 
exist in the Calvert Cliffs model because the smooth area change option was used. Nevertheless, Valve 603 
was moved from the lower half of the split hot leg to the surge line outlet as indicated in Figure 50 for con-
sistency. That modification did not seem necessary, but it was assumed to be acceptable because the con-
figurations were expected to be equivalent. However, results from scoping calculations indicated that surge 
line heating was affected by the surge line/hot leg nodalization. At that point, two formal analyses were 
performed as described below to complete the evaluation.
The first Calvert Cliffs calculation, designated Case CC-07, was identical to Case CC-05 as indicated 
in Table 4 except that countercurrent natural circulation behavior was re-benchmarked. Re-benchmarking 
was completed to eliminate the possibility that surge line heating was affected because natural circulation 
had been altered by changes in nodalization. Re-benchmarking was performed for the conditions assumed 
in Case CC-05 (and Case CC-01). Specifically, a hot/cold SG tube split of 53%/47%, a mixing fraction of 
0.87, and a recirculation ratio of 1.9 were assumed. The second calculation, designated Case CC-07OSL,
was identical to Case CC-07 except that the original surge line/hot leg nodalization (like Case CC-01) was 
used. A comparison of results from Cases CC-01, CC-05, CC-07, and CC-07OSL was expected to provide 
some indication of how the timing of surge line failure might be affected by the surge line/hot leg nodaliza-
tion.
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Surge line failure times for Calvert Cliffs Cases CC-01, CC-05, CC-07, and CC-07OSL are listed in 
Table 16. As indicated, the predicted timing of surge line failure was essentially the same in Cases CC-01
and CC-07OSL (at ~22,000 s) and in Cases CC-05 and CC-07 (at ~16,300 s). Two issues can be resolved 
based on those results. First, differences in SG nodalization introduced to accommodate sludge accumula-
tion do not affect surge line heatup and failure. That was verified because surge line failures were predicted 
at the same time in Cases CC-07OSL and CC-01 even though those analyses were completed with and 
without SG nodalization changes, respectively. Second, differences in surge line/hot leg nodalization were 
the cause of differences in the timing of surge line failures. That was verified because surge line failure 
times differed in Cases CC-07 and CC-07OSL, which were completed with and without modified surge 
line/hot leg nodalizations, respectively. Those results indicate a need for careful attention to the simulation 
of the surge line/hot leg connection, primarily in cases with intentional RCS depressurization through open 
pressurizer PORVs.
6. UNCERTAINTIES
Uncertainties can be grouped into those that arise because of current limitations in the simulation of 
severe reactor accidents, those that arise in relation to the specific sequence being considered, and those 
introduced through modeling approximations. Uncertainties associated with current limitations in severe 
accident simulation arise because experimental data addressing all pertinent phenomena are not complete 
or do not exist and because resources are not always available to develop computer models when data does 
exist. The prediction of everything from core heatup and oxidation through core degradation, melting, and 
relocation are affected to varying degrees. In this evaluation, however, such uncertainties are probably not 
significant because the analyses were generally extended only through the early phase of core damage 
(covering core heatup and oxidation). It is generally acknowledged within the technical community that 
severe accident behavior is relatively well characterized by SCDAP/RELAP5 during that phase.
Uncertainties associated with the TMLB’ accident are primarily related to the simulation of counter-
current natural circulation. To help evaluate those uncertainties, stand alone loop analyses were completed 
to determine changes in SG U-tube temperatures that could occur with changes in parameters that charac-
terize countercurrent natural circulation (including the number of tubes participating in hot [forward] flow, 
mixing fractions, and the recirculation ratio). In those analyses, one parameter was varied over the range of 
experimentally observed values while other parameters and conditions remained constant. Changes in the 
hottest tube temperatures near the time of surge line failure were calculated to be ~26 K, or less. A calcula-
tion was also completed for the Surry PWR where all parameters characterizing countercurrent natural cir-
culation were simultaneously set at 5% confidence values (corresponding to parameter values that should 
be smaller than 95% of all values) to determine if synergistic effects were more important. In that calcula-
tion, SG tubes were predicted to be ~50 K hotter at the time of surge line failure than they were in base 
analyses. Those results (covering individual and simultaneous changes in parameters) indicate that uncer-
tainties associated with simulation of countercurrent natural circulation in TMLB’ accidents did not signif-
icantly affect SG tube temperatures in this evaluation.
Sensitivity analyses were not completed to evaluate uncertainties associated with countercurrent natu-
ral circulation behavior in PWRs with once-through SGs. This is not believed to be critical because all 
once-through SGs analyses included the assumption that pressurizer PORVs would be latched open. Surge 
line heatup and failure was primarily driven by the resulting high temperature flows through the surge line 
39 INEEL/EXT-98-00286, Rev. 1
to open PORVs, and those conditions would not have been significantly altered by variations in natural cir-
culation behavior.
Uncertainties in the fraction of core decay energy absorbed in each SG as a result of countercurrent 
natural circulation were not specifically addressed. However, natural circulation flows and/or temperatures 
would have to increase in order to increase the fraction of energy absorbed. As flows and/or temperatures 
increase, all RCS piping temperatures, including surge line, hot leg, and SG tube temperatures, would be 
expected to increase. Therefore, the absolute timing of pressure boundary failures may shift, but a signifi-
cant difference in the relative timing between surge line and SG tube failures would not be expected. On 
that basis, further evaluation of the fraction of core decay energy that is absorbed in each SG appears to be 
unnecessary.
Uncertainties associated with modeling approximations include an under-estimation of the hot leg-to-
surge line resistance, potential servo valve logic problems in switching from hot leg countercurrent natural 
circulation to full-loop circulation, and limitations associated with the lack of natural circulation data for 
benchmarking models. Underestimation of the hot leg-to-surge line resistance primarily occurred in cases 
where pressurizer PORVs were latched open. All SCDAP/RELAP5 models used two valves to connect 
upper and lower halves of the split hot leg to the surge line. The surge line flow area was assigned to each 
valve. Under most conditions, only one of the two valves would be open at any given time. However, both 
valves were configured to open when the PORV opened. That approach was judged to be adequate as long 
the transient involved normal, cyclic PORV operation. However, modeling logic simply opened both 
valves when the PORV opened without distinguishing between cases with cyclic PORV operation and 
cases where PORVs were latched open. In cases with sustained PORV flows, the valves should have been 
opened half way to avoid under-estimation of the hot leg-to-surge line resistance. Since the hot leg-to-
surge line resistance was underestimated in cases where PORVs were latched open, flow and heat transfer 
could have been overestimated, which could lead to a premature prediction of surge line failure. This mod-
eling problem is believed to be a secondary concern, however, because flow from the hot leg to the surge 
line is generally controlled by choked flow through the open PORV.
The servo valve refinement (discussed in Section 3.2) included logic for switching from hot leg coun-
tercurrent natural circulation to full-loop natural circulation based on RCP loop seal liquid levels. That 
approach appeared to be adequate, given the time available for model development and testing. However, 
the logic could have been improved if the direction of flows and vessel liquid levels were also checked 
before allowing transition to full-loop natural circulation loss coefficients. Uncertainties introduced 
through this modeling simplification are unknown, although the potential for full-loop circulation was 
basically limited to those analyses where pressurizer PORVs were latched open (the plant RCS depressur-
ization analyses). Significant SG tube heating was predicted in those analyses following the onset of full-
loop circulation, although the increased heating did not result in SGTR because SG tube pressure differen-
tials were near zero as a result of RCS and SG secondary depressurization. Improvements in the servo 
valve switching logic would not be expected to substantially increase the potential for SGTR under those 
conditions.
Experimental data were used to benchmark hot leg countercurrent natural circulation modeling in 
PWRs with both U-tube and once-through SGs. Unfortunately, data were not available for benchmarking 
in-vessel or full-loop natural circulation in either configuration. However, all models were benchmarked 
against available data at normal, full-power, steady-state conditions, which provides a way to ensure that 
flows and pressure losses through the vessel and around the RCS piping are appropriate for subcooled liq-
uid flow. The established loss coefficients were subsequently applied, without modification, in the simula-
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tion of in-vessel and full-loop natural circulation. (Loss coefficients were only altered during periods of hot 
leg countercurrent natural circulation based on benchmarking for those particular conditions.) While that 
approach may not be completely satisfactory, it is a standard modeling procedure when data for specific 
conditions is not available. Furthermore, the resulting loss coefficients are expected to be reasonable 
because natural circulation flows are generally turbulent,21 which minimizes velocity-dependencies that 
can exist in certain geometries. Therefore, a reasonable simulation of in-vessel and full-loop natural circu-
lation is expected, with the possible exception of surge line modeling.
Surge line flows are generally stagnant during normal, full-power, steady-state operations. As a result, 
steady-state conditions cannot be used to benchmark surge line modeling. Since no other data were avail-
able, engineering judgement was applied. Specifically, standard practices for estimating flows through 
pipe and fittings were followed to calculate loss coefficients applicable to the surge line and the surge 
line/hot leg connection. Furthermore, when the surge line had to be connected to the split hot leg, it was 
assumed that flows into the surge line from top and bottom halves of the split hot leg should be equal. 
However, a flow imbalance was observed in some analyses with PORVs latched open despite efforts to 
nodalize with equal resistances between the surge line and the upper and lower halves of the split hot leg. 
Resistances at split surge line/hot leg connections were not exactly equal apparently because of subtle 
effects associated with the way flow area changes are treated by the code. In most cases, modifying the 
surge line/hot leg nodalization to improve the flow balance shortened the time to surge line failure. Those 
trends were observed for both abrupt and smooth area change modeling options, indicating that the SGTR 
potential was probably not adversely affected. However, careful attention to simulation of the surge 
line/hot leg connection would be appropriate if additional analyses are needed.
There was no effort to determine if results for the analyzed plants could be extended to cover all oper-
ating PWRs. Based on work that was completed in this evaluation, it would seem reasonable to expect sim-
ilar trends in other operating plants. However, that expectation is not supported by analysis at this time.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Natural circulation flows can develop during severe reactor accidents and transfer energy from the 
core to other parts of the RCS. The associated heatup of RCS structures can lead to pressure boundary fail-
ures, including a possibility for SGTR. A substantial number of SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses were com-
pleted to evaluate the potential for SGTR in operating PWRs as a result of natural circulation heating 
during TMLB’ accidents (and variations thereof). All RCS pressure boundaries, including the SG tubes, 
were assumed to be defect free with respect to the prediction of pressure boundary failures in all analyses. 
In this evaluation, Surry and Zion PWRs were used to represent Westinghouse three and four loop plants, 
respectively; Calvert Cliffs and ANO2 PWRs were used to represent Combustion Engineering plants with 
and without pressurizer PORVs, respectively; and the Oconee PWR was used to represent Babcock & Wil-
cox plants; thereby covering all existing PWR designs. In addition, natural circulation sensitivities were 
evaluated using a stand alone model of the Surry pressurizer coolant loop and selected nodalization sensi-
tivities were considered. Conclusions based on results from the SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses are summa-
rized below.
Within limitations, independent reviewers of this evaluation found Westinghouse experiments 
characterizing natural circulation during severe accidents to be well designed, SCDAP/RELAP5 
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to be capable of simulating those natural circulation flows, and SCDAP/RELAP5 modeling to 
assess the potential for SGTR in this evaluation to be adequate.
Independent review committee meetings were held to address the applicability of Westinghouse natu-
ral circulation experimental data, the suitability of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code, and the adequacy of 
SCDAP/RELAP5 natural circulation modeling with respect to this evaluation of the SGTR potential in 
operating PWRs. The independent review committee and the ACRS concluded that Westinghouse natural 
circulation experiments were well designed and executed. The reviewers did indicate that uncertainties in 
experimental parameters used to characterize hot leg countercurrent natural circulation had to be consid-
ered and that scaling could be affected by the absence of radiation heat transfer and other experimental 
shortcomings. Uncertainties in experimental parameters were addressed through numerous sensitivity 
analyses completed during the course of this evaluation. Experimental shortcomings were noted, although 
the experiments are considered valuable despite those problems because they verify the general behavior 
of natural circulation during severe accidents and provide a means for code validation that yields a level of 
confidence in similar full plant analyses.
The independent review committee also concluded that SCDAP/RELAP5 is capable of modeling natu-
ral circulation in PWRs under severe accident conditions for the purpose of calculating the relative timing 
of RCS component failures in order to assess the SGTR potential. The ACRS concurred after consideration 
of the independent review committee findings. Those conclusions were at least partially based on the fact 
that SCDAP/RELAP5 was shown to be capable of reproducing major trends in the Westinghouse experi-
ments and that agreement between data and code predictions was satisfactory. However, reviewers indi-
cated that code refinement was warranted in the calculation of convection heat transfer. Accordingly, 
correlations to treat the combination of forced and free (or mixed) convection heat transfer were added to 
the code and used in all subsequent analyses.
And finally, the independent review committee indicated that SCDAP/RELAP5 had been applied cor-
rectly in completing a significant number of analyses. However, the committee recommended non-dimen-
sionalization so that results from Westinghouse experiments and the SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses could be 
directly compared; sensitivity studies to evaluate uncertainties associated with heat transfer coefficients 
and the other parameters that characterize hot leg countercurrent natural circulation in PWRs with U-tube 
SGs, including the synergistic effects associated with varying several parameters at a time; and analyses to 
evaluate conjugate heat transfer effects in the split hot leg model (consisting of the combination of fluid-to-
wall heat transfer, fluid-to-fluid heat transfer, and circumferential conduction around the hot leg pipe wall). 
A broader series of sensitivity analyses for a broader spectrum of operating PWRs was completed instead 
of attempts at non-dimensionalization. Among other issues, uncertainties in the parameters that character-
ize hot leg countercurrent natural circulation, heat transfer coefficients, and conjugate heat transfer effects 
in the split hot leg model were considered.
SG U-tube temperatures are not significantly affected by changes in any individual parameter that 
characterizes hot leg countercurrent natural circulation over the range of variation that was 
experimentally observed.
SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses (using a stand alone version of the Surry pressurizer loop nodalization) 
were completed to evaluate changes in SG U-tube temperatures that could occur with changes in the 
parameters that characterize hot leg countercurrent natural circulation. Those parameters include the num-
ber of tubes participating in hot (forward) flow, mixing fractions, and the recirculation ratio. Only one 
parameter was allowed to change in each calculation while all other conditions remained constant. A num-
ber of analyses were then completed to cover the range of parameter variation that was experimentally 
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observed. Temperatures of the hottest SG U-tubes were found to increase (1) as the number of tubes partic-
ipating in hot (forward) flow decreased, (2) as mixing fractions decreased, and (3) as the recirculation ratio 
increased. However, changes in the hottest tube temperatures were calculated to be ~26 K, or less, which is 
insignificant compared to other uncertainties involved in the simulation of severe reactor accidents. Fur-
thermore, those differences did not significantly increase tube creep damage, indicating that any potential 
for SGTR would not develop until long after surge line failure over the range of parameters considered.
SG U-tube temperature response as a result of the synergistic effects associated simultaneous 
variations of natural circulation parameters is consistent with the temperature response associ-
ated with variations of individual parameters.
Results from stand alone loop sensitivity analyses indicate that SG tube temperatures increase when 
mixing fractions decrease, recirculation is increased, or the fraction of SG tubes participating in hot (for-
ward) flow is decreased. Results were found to be consistent with those trends in a synergistic sensitivity 
calculation where all natural circulation parameters were simultaneously adjusted. Specifically, SG U-tube 
temperatures were predicted to increase when mixing fractions, recirculation, and the fraction of SG tubes 
participating in hot (forward) flow were simultaneously decreased. Based on the stand alone loop sensitiv-
ity analyses, the temperature increase was expected because two of three natural circulation parameter 
changes supported prediction of the higher temperatures. Those results provide some validation that the 
stand alone loop analyses reasonably represent the response that could be expected in a full plant simula-
tion.
Simultaneous variations of parameters that characterize natural circulation in PWRs with U-tube 
SGs to relatively extreme values did not result in a potential for SGTR.
Analyses were completed where all parameters characterizing natural circulation in PWRs with U-tube 
SGs were simultaneously set to 5% confidence values (which were calculated assuming a normal distribu-
tion of the Westinghouse high pressure transient data). SG tube temperatures were predicted to increase 
and SGTR was accelerated under those conditions as expected. However, use of the 5% confidence values, 
which correspond to parameter values that should be smaller than 95% of all values, is believed to conser-
vatively represent the tail of the assumed distribution because each value was calculated independently 
without any allowance for relationships with the other parameters and all values were lower than any actu-
ally observed during the transient experiments. Nevertheless, surge line failure was still predicted some 
800 s prior to SGTR. Given that prediction of surge line failure, the potential for SGTR relative to simulta-
neous variations in natural circulation parameters is still low.
Uncertainties in heat transfer coefficients are not important in this evaluation because they do not 
significantly alter the potential for SGTR.
Uncertainties were considered in all heat transfer coefficients that could impact ex-vessel heating 
(those in the upper plenum, hot legs, surge line, and on the inner and outer surfaces of the SG U-tubes) and 
in all heat transfer coefficients in the hot leg, surge line, and SG U-tube entrance volumes, including an 
extreme case of enhancing only heat transfer coefficients in SG U-tube entrance volumes. Results indicate 
that the timing of SGTR could vary by 130 s given those uncertainties. Furthermore, SG tube temperatures 
at the time of surge line failure could vary from 938 to 964 K, a range of only 26 K. Those results would 
not be expected to significantly alter the potential for SGTR, indicating that heat transfer coefficient uncer-
tainties are not important factors in this evaluation.
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Conjugate heat transfer effects in the hot leg during countercurrent natural circulation tend to 
decrease the potential for SGTR in PWRs with U-tube SGs.
Analyses were completed to address the absence of fluid-to-fluid heat transfer and circumferential pipe 
wall conduction in the SCDAP/RELAP5 split hot leg model for PWRs with U-tube SGs. Results indicate 
that conjugate heat transfer effects reduce the difference between the temperature of the hot vapor in the 
top half of the hot leg and the temperature of the cooler vapor in the bottom half of the hot leg. That differ-
ential temperature reduction led to reduced hot leg countercurrent flows and reduced vapor temperatures in 
the SGs. As a result, SG U-tube temperatures were reduced and SGTR was delayed, indicating that conju-
gate heat transfer effects in the hot leg decrease the potential for SGTR. Consequently, a degree of conser-
vatism exists in analyses completed during the course of this evaluation due to the absence of conjugate 
heat transfer effects in hot leg modeling.
RCS pressure spikes associated with boiling that follows accumulator injection were not signifi-
cantly affected by core axial nodalization, indicating that the core axial nodalization used in this 
evaluation did not affect SGTR predictions.
Large pressure spikes were predicted following initial accumulator injections with or without refined 
core axial nodalization. When the core axial nodalization was increased, a somewhat lower peak pressure 
was reached and some extension of the pressure spike was predicted. However, those pressure differences 
were relatively minor and they would not be expected to significantly alter creep damage of any RCS pres-
sure boundary. Furthermore, the effects that were observed were primarily due to refinement in the core 
axial power profile that was adopted for consistency with the refined core nodalization. Effects associated 
with the refined power profile could have been minimized by retaining a constant (flat) power density for 
all subdivisions of a given node. Although that would produce a stepped approximation of the power pro-
file, a better evaluation of the separate effects of axial nodalization might have been achieved.
The timing of surge line failure can be affected by the nodalization used to simulate the surge 
line/hot leg connection, although an adverse impact on the potential for SGTR associated with that 
nodalization was not indicated in sensitivity analyses that were completed.
Results indicate that the surge line/hot leg nodalization can influence the flow balance between upper 
and lower halves of the split hot leg into the surge line. If a flow imbalance develops, surge line heating 
and failure can be affected. In most cases, modifying the surge line/hot leg nodalization to improve the 
flow balance shortened the time to surge line failure. Those trends were observed for both abrupt and 
smooth area change modeling options, indicating that the SGTR potential was probably not adversely 
affected. However, careful attention to simulation of the surge line/hot leg connection would be appropri-
ate if additional analyses are needed.
RCP loop seal clearing can be expected in operating PWRs with U-tube SGs during TMLB’ acci-
dents with SG secondary depressurization and intentional RCS depressurization through pressur-
izer PORVs.
RCP loop seal clearing (sufficient to allow development of full-loop natural circulation of primary 
vapor) was predicted in all SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses that were completed for PWRs with U-tube SGs and 
RCS depressurization through pressurizer PORVs. In the analyses that were completed, accumulator injec-
tion and RCS depressurization through the pressurizer PORVs appeared to be the most important factors 
affecting RCP loop seal clearing. Cold leg condensation during the initial phase of accumulator injection 
can reduce pressures downstream of the RCP loop seal, which can pull water out of the loop seal. In-core 
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boiling near the end of a given accumulator injection can increase pressures upstream of the RCP loop seal 
(particularly when water covers the bottom of the downcomer skirt), which can push water out of the loop 
seal. In addition, RCS depressurization through pressurizer PORVs can lead to flashing of water in the 
RCP loop seal. Loop seal clearing was predicted with or without RCP seal leaks, with or without DC-HL 
bypass flows, and with or without SG sludge accumulation.
RCP loop seal clearing in operating PWRs with once-through SGs can develop during TMLB’ 
accidents with SG secondary depressurization and intentional RCS depressurization through pres-
surizer PORVs only if RCP seals leak.
RCP loop seals in PWRs with once-through SGs cleared in all RCS depressurization analyses with 
RCP seal leaks but did not clear in analyses without RCP seal leaks. Boiling of liquid in the RCP loop seals 
as steam passed from the SGs to RCP leaks was apparently needed in order to clear the loop seals in the 
once-through SG configuration analyzed.
Full-loop natural circulation following RCP loop seal clearing will increase SG tube heating in 
the affected loop without impact on the potential for SGTR.
Results from SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses clearly indicate that SG tube heating in the affected loop will 
increase significantly (compared to heating in unaffected loops) after RCP loop seal clearing. The 
increased tube heating was predicted in U-tube and once-through SG configurations. Those results 
occurred even though full-loop natural circulation flows remained relatively low because pressurizer 
PORVs were generally latched open in analyses where RCP loop seal clearing developed. However, 
increases in SG tube heating were not severe enough to induce SG tube failure prior to the predicted failure 
of other RCS pressure boundaries. Therefore, full-loop natural circulation was not found to adversely 
impact the potential for SGTR in this evaluation.
Accumulators empty quicker and RCP loop seals clear more readily without impact on the SGTR 
potential if the DC-HL bypass is blocked.
Results from SCDAP/RELAP5 RCS depressurization analyses indicate that accumulators will empty 
quicker because downcomer pressurization during the steam production phase of accumulator injection is 
slower without DC-HL bypass flows. As a result, downcomer (and cold leg) pressures remain below accu-
mulator pressures for longer periods of time, allowing accumulators to empty quicker. When downcomer 
pressure response is slowed because DC-HL bypass flow paths are blocked, there is a greater tendency for 
initial accumulator-related condensation to “pull” and subsequent accumulator-related vaporization to 
“push” water out of the RCP loop seals, allowing loop seals to clear more readily. Those effects are not as 
important in plants with upper head vent valves because those valves tend to equalize upper plenum pres-
sures with pressures in the downcomer, with or without DC-HL bypass flows. However, there was no 
apparent impact on the potential for SGTR as a result of variations in DC-HL bypass flows.
Tube temperatures are higher in SGs with accumulated sludge than in SGs without sludge, 
although the higher temperatures did not adversely impact the potential for SGTR.
Results from SCDAP/RELAP5 RCS depressurization analyses indicate that tubes in SGs with sludge 
accumulation are hotter than tubes in clean SGs. Higher temperatures occur because sludge retards heat 
transfer from the SG tube wall. In some cases, the higher SG tube temperatures associated with sludge 
accumulation led to SGTR predictions. However, SGTR was always predicted long after failure of another 
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RCS pressure boundary (i.e., the surge line). Consequently, higher tube temperatures did not adversely 
impact the potential for SGTR.
A potential for SGTR does not exist without SG secondary depressurization.
Results from SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses for the Surry PWR indicate that SGTR will not occur if nor-
mal pressures are maintained the SG secondaries. The maximum pressure SG tube differential pressure is 
limited to ~9 MPa if normal SG secondary pressures are maintained. SG tube heating was not found to be 
severe enough to induce SGTR with that limited differential pressure.
Quenching of upper plenum stainless steel, if it is predicted to melt and relocate into the lower 
head, can contribute to the potential for SGTR in some PWRs.
SCDAP/RELAP5 results for the ANO2 PWR indicate that the integrity of RCS piping can be affected 
by pressure pertubations associated with boiling following accumulator injection. In one ANO2 calcula-
tion, the first failure in the RCS pressure boundary (in the hot leg) was closely followed by a SGTR as a 
result of the pressure pertubations. However, assuming that upper plenum stainless steel is quenched dur-
ing molten relocation into the lower head could be overly conservative with respect to the potential for 
SGTR. That is because the code conservatively assumes that all relocated material will be completely 
cooled to the saturation temperature of the lower head coolant during a single time step when the quench-
ing option is activated. Heat rejected from the molten material during that process is added directly to the 
lower head coolant during the same time step, which can lead to large vapor production rates. Furthermore, 
the stainless steel must candle through a tortuous path from the upper plenum all the way to the lower head 
without refreezing if quenching is to occur. Results indicate that temperatures near the bottom of the active 
fuel region (and above the lower head) can be cooler than the stainless steel melting temperature, particu-
larly in cases with RCS depressurization that activates the accumulators. In such cases, the stainless steel 
could refreeze before reaching the lower head and thereby eliminate the potential for quenching. Although 
results indicate a potential for SGTR in the ANO2 PWR if quenching does occur under specific conditions, 
similar results were not predicted for the Surry PWR.
Surge line (or hot leg) failure was predicted to be the first RCS pressure boundary failure in all 
analyses for all operating PWRs.
Surge line failure was predicted to be the first failure of the RCS pressure boundary in virtually all 
analyses completed during the course of this evaluation. Those surge line failures developed as a result of 
natural circulation heating and the flows associated with operation of pressurizer PORVs. The first RCS 
pressure boundary failures in four analyses with RCP seal leaks (and without intentional RCS depressur-
ization through the pressurizer PORVs) were found to be hot leg failures because surge line flow and there-
fore, surge line heating, was reduced as a result of flows through the seal leaks. (A hot leg failure was also 
predicted to be the first RCS pressure boundary failure in one other calculation as the result of a surge 
line/hot leg nodalization artifact.)
RCS depressurization that occurs following an initial pressure boundary failure effectively elimi-
nates the potential for a second failure at any other location in the RCS pressure boundary.
Rapid depressurization of the RCS will occur if the RCS pressure boundary fails. Accumulator injec-
tion will follow, providing water sufficient to arrest the heatup of the core and cool the RCS piping. Core 
reheating after the accumulator water boils away will primarily be directed out the pressure boundary 
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break, preventing any significant reheating of the RCS piping that is needed to induce a second failure. 
Furthermore, SGTR is very unlikely following any other RCS pressure boundary failure because the SG 
tubes will be subjected to compression loading as a result of RCS depressurization. SG tube collapse is 
possible, but relatively high temperatures in conjunction with the compression loads would be required to 
generate that type of failure.
The potential for SGTR in operating PWRs during TMLB’ accidents is low.
SCDAP/RELAP5 results indicate that in-vessel, full-loop, and hot leg countercurrent natural circula-
tion flows will develop during TMLB’ accidents in operating PWRs. Furthermore, surge line (or hot leg) 
failures were predicted to be the first failures in the RCS pressure boundary in all analyses as a result of 
heat transferred by those flows. Those results held for all operating PWRs that were analyzed in cases with 
and without RCP seal leaks, cases with and without intentional RCS depressurization through pressurizer 
PORVs, cases with and without SG secondary depressurization, cases with and without DC-HL bypass 
flows, cases with and without U-tube SG sludge accumulation, and cases with and without quenching of 
upper plenum stainless steel upon relocation to the lower head (if that steel was predicted to melt). Results 
also indicated that secondary failures of the RCS pressure boundary will not occur after RCS depressuriza-
tion, accumulator injection, and disruption of natural circulation heating associated with the first RCS pres-
sure boundary failure. In other words, a SGTR (or any other secondary failure in the RCS pressure 
boundary) would not be expected after depressurization through the first (surge line or hot leg) failure. 
Results from sensitivity analyses indicate that uncertainties associated with natural circulation behavior, 
heat transfer, and variety of other related factors are not large enough to adversely affect those conclusions. 
In one calculation for one operating PWR, SGTR was found to be imminent at the time of the first RCS 
pressure boundary failure as a result of large pressure pertubations associated with quenching of molten 
upper plenum stainless steel. Uncertainties may be large enough to preclude the possibility that SGTR 
could be the first RCS pressure boundary failure in that case. However, the assumption that stainless steel 
can candle through the core without refreezing and the subsequent simulation of complete and essentially 
instantaneous quenching are believed to be overly conservative with respect to the SGTR prediction. Any 
SGTR concerns in this single case would be expected to significantly to decrease if more detailed model-
ing were applied. Consequently, the potential for SGTR in operating PWRs during TMLB’ accidents is 
low. The conclusions of this evaluation apply if SG tubes (and other RCS piping) are defect free. Further 
evaluation would be needed to assess the potential for SGTR given the existence of structural flaws.
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Figure 1. Natural circulation flow patterns that could develop during certain severe accidents in PWRs 
with U-tube SGs.
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Figure 2. Natural circulation flow patterns that could develop during certain severe accidents in PWRs 
with once-through SGs.
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Figure 3. Surry reactor vessel nodalization.
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Figure 4. Surry pressurizer loop (Loop C) nodalization without provisions for hot leg countercurrent 
natural circulation.
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Figure 5. Surry pressurizer loop (Loop C) nodalization with provisions for hot leg countercurrent 
natural circulation.
Figure 6. Nodalization detail showing connections between the split hot leg and the split surge line.
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Figure 7. Zion reactor vessel nodalization.
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Figure 8. Zion pressurizer loop (Loop A) nodalization without provisions for hot leg countercurrent 
natural circulation.
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Figure 9. Zion pressurizer loop (Loop A) nodalization with provisions for hot leg countercurrent natural 
circulation.
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Figure 10. Calvert Cliffs reactor vessel nodalization.
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Figure 13. ANO2 reactor vessel nodalization.
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Figure 16. Oconee reactor vessel nodalization.
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Figure 19. Nodalization used to complete the stand alone loop analyses.
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Figure 20.  Volume-averaged SG U-tube temperatures at the tube bundle hot spot for the stand alone tube 
split sensitivity calculations.
Figure 21.  Volume-averaged SG U-tube temperatures at the tube bundle hot spot for the stand alone 
mixing fraction sensitivity calculations.
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Figure 22.  Volume-averaged SG U-tube temperatures at the tube bundle hot spot for the stand alone 
recirculation ratio sensitivity calculations.
Figure 23.  RCS pressure in the reactor vessel lower head for Surry Case SUR-01.
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Figure 24.   SG secondary pressure for Surry Case SUR-01.
Figure 25.  Reactor vessel collapsed liquid level for Surry Case SUR-01.
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Figure 26.  Volume-averaged temperatures of pressurizer loop piping for Surry Case SUR-01.
Figure 27.  Creep damage terms for RCS piping in Surry Case SUR-01.
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Figure 28.  RCS pressure in the reactor vessel lower head for Surry Case SUR-02.
Figure 29.  Reactor vessel collapsed liquid level for Surry Case SUR-02.
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Figure 30.  Volume-averaged temperatures of pressurizer loop piping for Surry Case SUR-02.
Figure 31.  SG secondary pressures for Surry Case SUR-03.
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Figure 32.  Volume-averaged temperatures of pressurizer loop piping for Surry Case SUR-03.
Figure 33.  Comparison between volume-averaged temperatures of the pressurizer loop SG tubes for 
Surry Cases SUR-01 and SUR-05.
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Figure 34.  Volume-averaged temperatures of pressurizer loop piping for Surry Case SUR-06.
Figure 35.  Volume-averaged temperatures of pressurizer loop piping for ANO2 Case ANO2-01.
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Figure 36.  Volume-averaged temperatures of pressurizer loop piping for ANO2 Case ANO2-02.
Figure 37.  Pressurizer loop vapor temperatures upstream of the SGs for Surry Cases SUR-06A and 
SUR-06B.
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Figure 38.  Pressurizer loop hot leg nozzle vapor temperature differences for Surry Cases SUR-06 and 
SUR-06E.
Figure 39.  SG tube temperatures for Zion Case ZI-01.
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Figure 40. Hot leg/surge line connections for the Zion PWR.
(a) Original hot leg/surge line connection
100-03 100-02 100-01
101-03 101-04 101-05
154
Surge line: a = .7212 ft2
Hot leg: a = 2.2935 ft2
Hot leg: a = 2.2935 ft2
155: abrupt, a = .7212 ft2
156: abrupt, a = .7212 ft2
frictionless
154-01: smooth, non-choking
(b) Modified hot leg/surge line connection
100-03 100-02 100-01
101-03 101-04 101-05
154
Hot leg: a = 2.2935 ft2
Hot leg: a = 2.2935 ft2
155: abrupt, a = .7212 ft2
156: abrupt, a = .7212 ft2
frictionless
154-01: smooth, non-choking
153-03
153-02
153-01
Surge line: a = .7212 ft2
153-03
153-02
153-01
to reactor vessel
from reactor vessel
to reactor vessel
from reactor vessel
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Figure 41. Normal circulation patterns in a PWR showing (a) DC-HL bypass and (b) core bypass flows.
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Figure 42. Details typical of regions near the SG tube sheet showing (a) conventional SCDAP/RELAP5 
nodalization, (b) refined nodalization needed to calculate the thermal effects of SG sludge, and (c) 
nodalization needed for direct comparison of results without SG sludge.
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Figure 43.  SG tube temperatures for Surry Cases SUR-24 (without SG sludge accumulation) and SUR-25 
(with SG sludge accumulation).
Figure 44.  SG tube creep damage indices for Calvert Cliffs Cases CC-05 (without SG sludge 
accumulation) and CC-06 (with SG sludge accumulation).
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Figure 45. Calvert Cliffs nodalizations for core models with 10 and 20 axial nodes.
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Figure 46.  RCS pressure response for Calvert Cliffs using core models with 10 and 20 axial nodes.
Figure 47.  Accumulator liquid volumes for Calvert Cliffs using core models with 10 and 20 axial nodes.
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Figure 48.  PORV inlet vapor temperatures for Calvert Cliffs using core models with 10 and 20 axial 
nodes.
Figure 49.  Total hydrogen generated for Calvert Cliffs using core models with 10 and 20 axial nodes.
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Figure 50. Hot leg/surge line connections for the Calvert Cliffs PWR.
600-03
(a) Original hot leg/surge line connection
600-02
600-01
105-03 105-02 105-01
108-01 108-02 108-03
602
Surge line: a = .5592 ft2
Hot leg: a = 5.0965 ft2
Hot leg: a = 5.0965 ft2
601: smooth, a = .5592 ft2, kf = .88, kr = .43
603: smooth, a = .5592 ft2, kf = .88, kr = .43
frictionless
602-01: smooth, non-choking
600-03
(b) Modified hot leg/surge line connection
600-02
600-01
105-03 105-02 105-01
108-01 108-02 108-03
602
Surge line: a = .5592 ft2
Hot leg: a = 5.0965 ft2
Hot leg: a = 5.0965 ft2
601: smooth, a = .5592 ft2, kf = .88, kr = .43
603: smooth, a = .5592 ft2, kf = .88, kr = .43
frictionless
602-01: smooth, non-choking
to reactor vessel
from reactor vessel
from reactor vessel
to reactor vessel
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Table 1. Results from Westinghouse high pressure natural circulation experiments.a
a. See Reference 3.
Experimentb
b. Steady state tests include those with a ‘-Sx’ designation while transient tests include those with a ‘-Tx’ designation.
Fraction of SG Tubes in Hot (Forward) Flow Mixing Fractionc
c. Hot and cold mixing fractions were assumed to be equal.
Recirculation Ratio
SG-S1 0.35 0.87 2.18
SG-S2 0.29 0.89 1.78
SG-S3 0.35 0.85 2.01
SG-S4 0.29 0.85 1.69
SG-T1 0.55 0.78 1.88
SG-T2 0.51 0.83 2.39
SG-T3 0.61 0.76 2.28
SG-T4 0.47 0.86 2.10
Table 2. Results from University of Maryland natural circulation experiments.a
a. See Reference 4.
Location  Temperature Rise (K)
Surge line 35.2
Hot leg 0.656 m above the surge line 17.5
Hot leg 1.75 m above the surge line 13.7
Hot leg 2.84 m above the surge line 11.1
Hot leg 5.03 m above the surge line 6.30
Hot leg 7.22 m above the surge line 3.60
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Table 3. Variation of countercurrent flow parameters in SCDAP/RELAP5 stand alone loop analyses.a
a. See Reference 22.
Countercurrent Flow Parameter BaseCase
SG U-Tube Split 
Sensitivities
Mixing
Fraction
Sensitivities
Recirculation 
Ratio
Sensitivities
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7
29% SG U-tubes in hot (forward) flow x
35% SG U-tubes in hot (forward) flow x x x x x
53% SG U-tubes in hot (forward) flow x
61% SG U-tubes in hot (forward) flow x
Mixing fractions of 0.76 x
Mixing fractions of 0.87 x x x x x x
Mixing fractions of 0.89 x
Recirculation ratio of 1.69 x
Recirculation ratio of 1.92 x x x x x x
Recirculation ratio of 2.25 x
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Table 4. SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses for operating PWRs.
Case Description
SUR-01 Surry TMLB’ without recovery; without operator actions; with quenching if upper plenum steel 
melts and relocates into lower head; without break initiation and associated depressurization 
following predicted RCS pressure boundary failures; without SG secondary depressurization; 
with natural circulation benchmarked at average steady state values (35%/65% hot/cold SG 
tube split, 0.87 mixing fraction, 1.9 recirculation ratio); with SG energy deposition above 
Reference 9 levels; without mixed convection code updates; without servo valve modeling 
refinement; also documented in Reference 23
SUR-02 Case SUR-01 with break initiation and associated depressurization following predicted RCS 
pressure boundary failure; also documented in Reference 23
SUR-03 Surry TMLB’ without recovery; without operator actions; without quenching if upper plenum 
steel melts and relocates into lower head; without break initiation and associated depressur-
ization following predicted RCS pressure boundary failures; with pressurizer loop SG sec-
ondary depressurization through failed relief valve; with natural circulation benchmarked at 
average steady state values (35%/65% hot/cold SG tube split, 0.87 mixing fraction, 1.9 recir-
culation ratio); with SG energy deposition above Reference 9 levels; with mixed convection 
code updates; without servo valve modeling refinement; also documented in Reference 23
with subsequent updates as documented in Reference 24
SUR-04 Case SUR-02 with pressurizer loop SG secondary depressurization through failed relief valve; 
also documented in Reference 23
SUR-05 Case SUR-01 with 53%/47% hot/cold SG tube split; also documented in Reference 23
SUR-06 Case SUR-03 with 53%/47% hot/cold SG tube split; also documented in Reference 23 with sub-
sequent updates as documented in Reference 24
SUR-07 Case SUR-01 with depressurization of all SG secondaries through failed relief valves; also docu-
mented in Reference 23
SUR-08 Case SUR-03 with seal leaks of 250 gpm per RCP; with quenching if upper plenum steel melts 
and relocates into lower head; without mixed convection code updates; also documented in 
Reference 28
SUR-09 Case SUR-03 with seal leaks of 250 gpm per RCP; without mixed convection code updates; also 
documented in Reference 28
SUR-06A Case SUR-06 with heat transfer coefficients multiplied by 1.2 in upper plenum, in hot legs, in 
surge line, and on inner and outer SG tube surfaces; also documented in Reference 24
SUR-06B Case SUR-06 with heat transfer coefficients multiplied by 0.8 in upper plenum, in hot legs, in 
surge line, and on inner and outer SG tube surfaces; also documented in Reference 24
SUR-06C Case SUR-06 with heat transfer coefficients multiplied by 1.3 in hot leg, surge line, and SG tube 
entrance volumes; also documented in Reference 24
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SUR-06D Case SUR-06 with heat transfer coefficients multiplied by 1.3 in SG tube entrance volumes; also 
documented in Reference 24
SUR-06E Case SUR-06 with hot leg fluid-to-fluid heat transfer and circumferential wall conduction; also 
documented in Reference 24
SUR-06F Surry TMLB’ without recovery; without operator actions; without quenching if upper plenum 
steel melts and relocates into lower head; without break initiation and associated depressur-
ization following predicted RCS pressure boundary failures; with pressurizer loop SG sec-
ondary depressurization through failed relief valve; with natural circulation benchmarked at 
5% transient data confidence values (43%/57% hot/cold SG tube split, 0.73 mixing fraction, 
1.8 recirculation ratio); with SG energy deposition above Reference 9 levels; with mixed 
convection code updates; without servo valve modeling refinement; also documented in 
Reference 24
SUR-20 Surry TMLB’ without recovery; without quenching if upper plenum steel melts and relocates into 
lower head; without break initiation and associated depressurization following predicted 
RCS pressure boundary failures; with pressurizer loop SG secondary depressurization 
through failed relief valve; with natural circulation benchmarked with 53%/47% hot/cold SG 
tube split, 0.87 mixing fraction, and 1.9 recirculation ratio; with Reference 9 SG energy dep-
osition levels; with pressurizer PORVs latched open at a core exit temperature of 922 K; with 
mixed convection code updates; with servo valve modeling refinement; also documented in 
Reference 32
SUR-21 Case SUR-20 with seal leaks of 125 gpm per RCP; also documented in Reference 33
SUR-22 Case SUR-20 with seal leaks of 250 gpm per RCP; also documented in Reference 33
SUR-23 Case SUR-20 with downcomer-hot leg bypass closed when hot leg countercurrent nodalization 
was introduced; also documented in Reference 34
SUR-24 Case SUR-20 with renodalization of SG tube sheet when hot leg countercurrent nodalization was 
introduced; with correction of hot leg/surge line cross connecting valve trips; also docu-
mented in Reference 40
SUR-25 Case SUR-20 with renodalization of SG tube sheet and sludge accumulation to a depth of 12 in 
when hot leg countercurrent nodalization was introduced; with correction of hot leg/surge 
line cross connecting valve trips; also documented in Reference 40
ZI-01 Zion TMLB’ without recovery; without quenching if upper plenum steel melts and relocates into 
lower head; without break initiation and associated depressurization following predicted 
RCS pressure boundary failures; with pressurizer loop SG secondary depressurization 
through failed relief valve; with natural circulation benchmarked with 53%/47% hot/cold SG 
tube split, 0.87 mixing fraction, and 1.9 recirculation ratio; with Reference 9 SG energy dep-
osition levels; with pressurizer PORVs latched open at a core exit temperature of 922 K; with 
mixed convection code updates; with servo valve modeling refinement; also documented in 
Reference 32
Table 4. SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses for operating PWRs. (continued)
Case Description
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ZI-02 Case ZI-01 with seal leaks of 125 gpm per RCP; with corrected hot leg/surge line connection; 
also documented in Reference 33
ZI-03 Case ZI-01 with seal leaks of 250 gpm per RCP; with corrected hot leg/surge line connection; 
also documented in Reference 33
ZI-04 Case ZI-01 with downcomer-hot leg bypass closed when hot leg countercurrent nodalization was 
introduced; also documented in Reference 34
ZI-05 Case ZI-01 with renodalization of SG tube sheet when hot leg countercurrent nodalization was 
introduced; also documented in Reference 40
ZI-06 Case ZI-01 with renodalization of SG tube sheet and sludge accumulation to a depth of 12 in 
when hot leg countercurrent nodalization was introduced; also documented in Reference 40
CC-01 Calvert Cliffs TMLB’ without recovery; without quenching if upper plenum steel melts and relo-
cates into lower head; without break initiation and associated depressurization following pre-
dicted RCS pressure boundary failures; with pressurizer loop SG secondary depressurization 
through failed relief valve; with natural circulation benchmarked with 53%/47% hot/cold SG 
tube split, 0.87 mixing fraction, and 1.9 recirculation ratio; with Reference 9 SG energy dep-
osition levels; with pressurizer PORVs latched open at a core exit temperature of 922 K; with 
mixed convection code updates; with servo valve modeling refinement; also documented in 
Reference 32
CC-02 Case CC-01 with seal leaks of 110 gpm per RCP; also documented in Reference 33
CC-03 Case CC-01 with seal leaks of 220 gpm per RCP; also documented in Reference 33
CC-04 Case CC-01 with downcomer-hot leg bypass closed when hot leg countercurrent nodalization 
was introduced; also documented in Reference 34
CC-05 Case CC-01 with renodalization of SG tube sheet when hot leg countercurrent nodalization was 
introduced; with modified hot leg/surge line connections; also documented in Reference 40
CC-06 Case CC-01 with renodalization of SG tube sheet and sludge accumulation to a depth of 12 in 
when hot leg countercurrent nodalization was introduced; with modified hot leg/surge line 
connections; also documented in Reference 40
CC-02CN Case CC-02 with refined core nodalization (increased from 10 to 20 axial nodes)
CC-07 Case CC-05 with natural circulation re-benchmarked with 53%/47% hot/cold SG tube split, 0.87 
mixing fraction, and 1.9 recirculation ratio
CC-07OSL Case CC-07 without modified hot leg/surge line connections
Table 4. SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses for operating PWRs. (continued)
Case Description
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ANO2-01 ANO2 TMLB’ without recovery; without operator actions; with quenching if upper plenum steel 
melts and relocates into lower head; without break initiation and associated depressurization 
following predicted RCS pressure boundary failures; with pressurizer loop SG secondary 
depressurization through failed relief valve; with natural circulation benchmarked at average 
steady state values (35%/65% hot/cold SG tube split, 0.87 mixing fraction, 1.9 recirculation 
ratio); with SG energy deposition above Reference 9 levels; without mixed convection code 
updates; without servo valve modeling refinement; also documented in Reference 30
ANO2-02 Case ANO2-01 with break initiation and associated depressurization following predicted RCS 
pressure boundary failure; also documented in Reference 30
ANO2-03 Case ANO2-01 with seal leaks of 220 gpm per RCP; also documented in Reference 30
ANO2-04 Case ANO2-03 without quenching if upper plenum steel melts and relocates into lower head; also 
documented in Reference 30
OC-01 Oconee TMLB’ without recovery; without quenching if upper plenum steel melts and relocates 
into lower head; without break initiation and associated depressurization following predicted 
RCS pressure boundary failures; with pressurizer loop SG secondary depressurization 
through failed relief valve; with natural circulation benchmarked against University of Mary-
land experimental data listed in Table 2; with pressurizer PORVs latched open at a core exit 
temperature of 922 K; with mixed convection code updates; with servo valve modeling 
refinement; also documented in Reference 32
OC-02 Case OC-01 with seal leaks of 125 gpm per RCP; also documented in Reference 33
OC-03 Case OC-01 with seal leaks of 250 gpm per RCP; also documented in Reference 33
OC-04 Case OC-01 with downcomer-hot leg bypass closed when hot leg countercurrent nodalization 
was introduced; also documented in Reference 34
Table 4. SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses for operating PWRs. (continued)
Case Description
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Table 5. Pressure boundary failure timing in the SCDAP/RELAP5 initial plant analyses.
Case
Failure Times (s) First Tube Failure 
minus First Failure 
Timing Difference 
(s)
End of
Calculation
(s)SurgeLine
Hot Legs SG Tubes
A B C A B C
SUR-01a
a. Surry has three primary coolant loops where hot leg C and SG tube C are part of the loop containing the pressurizer.
14,050 15,670 15,670 15,110 ncb
b. Not calculated.
nc nc nc 18,900
SUR-02 14,050 nc nc nc nc nc nc nc 21,000
SUR-03 13,640 nc nc nc nc nc 14,650 1010 14,650
SUR-04 14,460 nc nc nc nc nc nc nc 20,800
SUR-05 14,050 nc nc nc nc nc nc nc 14,050
SUR-06 13,730 nc nc 14,750 nc nc 14,960 1230 14,960
SUR-07 13,110 nc nc 13,740 14,030 14,030 nc 1340 14,030
SUR-08 nc nc 16,510 nc nc nc nc nc 16,510
SUR-09 nc nc 16,130 nc nc nc nc nc 16,130
ANO2-01c
c. ANO2 has two primary coolant loops where hot leg A and SG tube A are part of the loop containing the pressurizer.
11,330 12,150 12,510 nad
d. Not applicable.
13,750 nc na 2420 13,750
ANO2-02 11,330 nc nc na nc nc na nc 21,550
ANO2-03 nc nc 18,330 na 18,400 nc na 70 18,400
ANO2-04 nc 24,530 21,400 na nc nc na nc 29,340
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Table 6. Sequence of transient events in Surry Case SUR-01.
Event Time (s)
TMLB’ initiation 0
Onset of pressurizer PORV cycling 4980
Steam generators dry out (non-pressurizer/pressurizer loops) 5010/5040
End of full loop (liquid) natural circulation 7760
Collapsed liquid level falls below the top of the fuel rods 9030
Vapor in the core exit begins to superheat; hot leg countercurrent circulation begins 9205
Collapsed liquid level falls below the bottom of the fuel rods 10,670
Pressurizer drains; remains empty for duration of transient 11,180
Onset of fuel rod oxidation 11,460
Pressurizer surge line fails by creep rupture 14,050
Upper plenum stainless steel melts and relocates to the lower head 14,610
Upper plenum stainless steel melts and relocates to the lower head 14,680
Upper plenum stainless steel melts and relocates to the lower head 15,100
Pressurizer loop hot leg nozzle fails by creep rupture 15,110
Non-pressurizer loop hot leg nozzles fail by creep rupture 15,670
Upper plenum stainless steel melts and relocates to the lower head 16,490
End of calculation 18,900
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Table 7. Sequence of transient events in Surry Case SUR-06.
Event Time (s)
TMLB’ initiation 0
Pressurizer loop SG RV opens and fails to close < 20
Onset of pressurizer PORV cycling 1960
Steam generators dry out (pressurizer/non-pressurizer loops) 2020/5260
End of full loop (liquid) natural circulation 7690
Collapsed liquid level falls below the top of the fuel rods 8920
Vapor in the core exit begins to superheat; hot leg countercurrent circulation begins 9091
Collapsed liquid level falls below bottom of fuel rods 10,530
Pressurizer drains; remains empty for duration of transient 10,820
Onset of fuel rod oxidation 11,620
Pressurizer surge line fails by creep rupture 13,730
Upper plenum stainless steel melts and relocates to lower head 14,110
Upper plenum stainless steel melts and relocates to lower head 14,460
Pressurizer Loop C hot leg fails by creep rupture 14,750
Upper plenum stainless steel melts and relocates to lower head 14,930
Pressurizer Loop C SG tubes fail by creep rupture 14,960
End of calculation 14,960
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Table 8. Results from selected SCDAP/RELAP5 plant sensitivity analyses.
Case First SG Tube Failure minus First Failure Timing Difference
Pressurizer Loop SG Tube Temperature
@ Surge Line Failure Time
SUR-06B
(“h” x 0.8)
1180 s 964.4 K
SUR-06D
(“h” x 1.3 in SG tube entrances)
1220 s 957.3 K
SUR-06
(nominal “h”)
1230 s 956.8 K
SUR-06C
(“h” x 1.3 in all entrances)
1250 s 944.2 K
SUR-06A
(“h” x 1.2)
1310 s 937.6 K
Table 9. Pressure boundary failure timing in the SCDAP/RELAP5 plant sensitivity analyses.
Case
Failure Times (s) First Tube Failure 
minus First Failure 
Timing Difference 
(s)
End of
Calculation
(s)SurgeLine
Hot Legs SG Tubes
A B C A B C
SUR-06 13,730 nca
a. Not calculated.
nc 14,750 nc nc 14,960 1230 14,960
SUR-06A 13,590 14,760 14,760 14,440 nc nc 14,900 1310 14,900
SUR-06B 13,610 nc nc nc nc nc 14,790 1180 14,790
SUR-06C 13,690 14,730 14,730 14,440 nc nc 14,940 1250 14,940
SUR-06D 13,700 nc nc 14,730 nc nc 14,920 1220 14,920
SUR-06E 13,580 15,020 15,020 14,650 nc nc 15,090 1510 15,090
SUR-06F 13,780 nc nc nc nc nc 14,580 800 14,580
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Table 13.  Thermal properties of steam generator sludge constituents based an Indian Point III analysis.
Constituent WeightPercent
Specific
Gravity
(at ambient 
conditions)
Volume
Percent
k
(W/m-K)a
a. All thermal properties, except those for silicon dioxide and water, were taken from References 38 and 39. Silicon dioxide 
and water properties were taken from Reference 37.
cp
(J/kg-K)a
400 K 1500 K 400 K 1000 K 1500 Kb
b. With the exception of iron, all heat capacities at 1500 K were essentially identical to heat capacities at 1000 K.
Cu 27 8.96 6.1 392 330c
c. Data is for solid copper at 1356 K. Copper melts at 1356 K.
398 502c 502
Fe 24 7.87 6.1 69.4 31.8 502 1680 670
Zn 2.7 2.20 2.5 116 7.30d
d. Data is an estimate at 1100 K. Zinc melts at 693 K.
398 461 461e
e. Data is for solid zinc at 693 K. Zinc melts at 693 K.
Ni 2.2 8.90 0.5 80.1 82.5 670 628 628
Mn 1.4 7.33 0.4 7.80f
f. Data is an estimate at 300 K.
7.80f 502 670 670
SiO2 1 1.82 1.1 1.5 6.20g
g. Data is an estimate at 1400 K.
879 1260 1260
C 0.45 2.10 0.4 2.2 3.5 837 1800 1800
H2O 41.25
(liquid)
1
(steam 0.00055)
82.9 0.03
(steam)
0.1
(steam)
2000
(steam)
2600
(steam)
2600
(steam)
Table 14.  Thermal properties of steam generator sludge used in the SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses.
Temperature (K) Thermal Conductivity (W/m-K) Heat Capacity (J/kg-K)
400 3.1 272
1000 2.7 586
1500 2.4 343
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Table 16.  Timing of surge line failures in selected Calvert Cliffs SCDAP/RELAP5 analyses relative to 
selected differences in nodalization.
 Case
Hot Leg/Surge Line Connection SG Sludge 
Nodalization Surge Line Failure Times (s)Original Modified
CC-01 x no 22,000
CC-05 x yes 16,230
CC-07 x yes 16,350
CC-07OSL x yes 21,850
